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A FULL
AND
DETAILED HISTORY
OF THE
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG,

BY A. S. ABRAMS,
OF NEW ORLEANS.

Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1863,
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA :
INTELLIGENCER STEAM POWER PRESSES.
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TO
MAJOR GENERAL WM. LORING,

This History is respectfully Dedicated,

IN HUMBLE APPRECIATION OF

HIS SKILL AS AN OFFICER,

BY

The Author.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

Soon after my arrival from Vicksburg, where I was taken prisoner, I contributed two articles to the "Advertiser and Register," of Mobile, Alabama, under the signature of "ONE OF THE GARRISON." One of these articles was an account of the Battle of Baker's Creek and Big Black, and the other a condensed account of the Siege of Vicksburg. The statements made in these two articles were from my own personal observation, and information received from sources of undoubted veracity.

The appearance of my two articles became the theme of criticisms by the press. Some of which were favorable, but others bitterly denounced the author as having acted through a feeling of prejudice against General Pemberton. Aware, as I am, that none in the Confederacy acted in a more cordial manner towards that General's control of the Army of Vicksburg than I did, I did not notice the many denunciatory remarks made, at the time, but compiled the work presented for the purpose of showing, that instead of being as censorious as the case allowed, I had kept silent in many things, which, had they been made public, would have raised a clamor against General Pemberton of a far more violent nature than what was hurled at him.

The author claims the right of knowing as much about the siege of Vicksburg as any one residing in that town, from the fact that he was at that point, in Company A, Withers' Light Artillery, as a private, when the first gun was fired in its defense, and served as such until the raising of the first siege. In September, 1862, he was discharged from the army on account of sickness, and being unable to return to his home, (New Orleans) obtained a position in the office of the "Vicksburg Whig," where he remained until its destruction by fire in the early part of May, 1863, and was taken prisoner and paroled after the surrender.

All the statements made in this work were either the result of the Author's observation, or obtained from parties whose standing in the Army warrants the Author in saying that the statements are beyond dispute, and, did not military law prevent it, the names of many prominent officers could be called in corroboration of all that is written in this work. My remarks are not only my own opinions, but the conclusions to which nine-tenths of the officers comprising the garrison of Vicksburg arrived

at some time before the attack on Grand Gulf, and verified by the results following.

All that has been said or written, in defense of Gen. Pemberton's campaign, is fairly laid before the public, at the same time the Author brings forward all the evidence possible to prove that the defense is not one to which any credence can be attached. He, however, leaves it to the judgment of the reader, whether the defense made is sufficiently strong to falsify his assertions.

In conclusion the Author would say, that although aware of the many criticisms that a work of this nature will be subject to, he gives it to the public without fearing the censure of any. To those *not interested* in defending Gen. Pemberton from the errors he committed during the campaign, the work presented to the public will be recognized as, if a severe, at least a just account of all that transpired in Mississippi; and to those *who are interested* in defending Gen. Pemberton, as soon as the censure of this work is made public, the Author flatters himself of his ability to *lay bare the motives which prompted the defense*. Conscious that this work has been written in the firm belief of its truth, favorable criticism will be welcome; but the censure and denunciations of the press will not cause the least regret that he has given truths and facts to the public as they occurred.

A. S. ABRAMS.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, NOVEMBER, 1863.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST SIEGE, IN 1862.

On the 18th day of May, 1862, the advance division of Commodore Farragut's fleet, under Lieutenant Lee, United States Navy, arrived below Vicksburg, from New Orleans, and demanded the surrender of the city. (It may be proper to state, that as soon as New Orleans fell, the heights of Vicksburg were fortified, it is said by advice of Gen. Beauregard.) The demand was refused, and the Federal commander gave twenty-four hours' notice for the women and children to quit the town.

In accordance with the notice, Major General, then Brigadier General, M. L. Smith, commanding the defenses, ordered all non-combatants to leave the town, and actively prepared for the enemy. At this time the garrison consisted of the following regiments: the 26th, 27th, 28th, 30th, 31st and 4th Louisiana infantry; the 1st regiment and 8th battalion of Louisiana heavy artillery; 1st Tennessee heavy artillery; 3d Mississippi battalion of infantry; Withers' light artillery regiment of ten fine batteries, and Stark's regiment of cavalry.

On the 26th of May the first bombardment took place, and was continued with little or no damage to the forts, until the departure of the fleet.

The enemy's land forces, under Brigadier General Williams, occupied the Louisiana shore, nearly opposite Warrenton, and about twelve miles below Vicksburg, to the number of 6,000, but attempted no demonstration against the city, being kept there more as a corps of observation, than for the purpose of making an offensive movement.

It had been a matter of surprise to a great many persons, that Vicksburg was not then attacked by land, as from the feeble nature of our defenses, and the small number of men defending it; we could easily have been defeated in a pitched battle and driven out; but General Butler lacked both the capacity and force to attempt an enterprise of so bold a nature. Besides which, Memphis being in our possession then, and Beauregard

confronting Halleck with an army of tried veterans, any serious attack on Vicksburg, if defeated, would have placed Butler in New Orleans, and Halleck before Corinth, in a very dangerous position, so that, taking all things into consideration, it is now evident that the enemy was not then prepared to take Vicksburg, and the bombardment was only to keep us on the *qui vive*, and compel us to mass troops there; thus either weakening, or preventing reinforcements from going to, Beauregard, so that Halleck would be enabled to overpower and destroy the only barrier to his sweeping through Mississippi, Tennessee and Alabama. That that was the plan, after events made evident.

The capture of New Orleans was an event less expected by the enemy than by our people. The attack on the forts was for the same purpose as the after bombardment of Vicksburg, viz: to keep us on the alert, and prevent any troops from being sent to Beauregard. The capture of New Orleans did them more harm than good, and had we neglected to fortify Vicksburg, and held Memphis, the result would have been greatly in our favor; for, by sending the 10,000 or 12,000 troops defending Vicksburg to Corinth, Beauregard would have been able to assume the offensive and drive Halleck from Tennessee. Butler's force in Louisiana was scarcely more than enough to hold the city of New Orleans; therefore, no attempt of a serious nature would have been made to penetrate the interior of the State of Mississippi. But to resume our account of the first siege.

On the 28th of June, 1862, the first serious assault was made by the enemy on water. At about two o'clock on the morning of that day, seven of the enemy's boats advanced in front of the city, and attempted to pass the batteries. A terrific bombardment ensued, but in consequence of our having only seven guns mounted at that time, the attempt was successful, and the fleet passed up.

Soon after the commencement of the siege, Major General Earl Van Dorn was sent to Vicksburg, and placed in command over Brigadier General M. L. Smith. His arrival was hailed with joy by the people of Mississippi, as an advent of success to our arms, Gen. Van Dorn having the reputation of being a "fighting man." Soon after his arrival, the garrison was reinforced by Major General Breckinridge's division, from Beauregard's army.

The bombardment progressed slowly until the 15th of July, when the Confederate ram "Arkansas" successfully run the gauntlet, through thirty of the enemy's gun and mortar boats. This feat, in point of daring, was the most brilliant and successful of the war, and reflected great credit on Lieutenant Brown, the commander. In referring to this boat, we cannot resist making a few observations on the folly of Gen. Van Dorn in sending her to Baton Rouge, as, if she had been kept at Vicks-

burg, after the occupation of Port Hudson, she would have been the means of keeping the river open between that place and Vicksburg. Not a single Yankee transport would have dared to pass our batteries, through fear of being captured or destroyed by her, and those gunboats which had the temerity to venture past, would have fallen an easy prey to her, aided as she would have been by the gunboats Webb and Beatty. The end of this famous ram was her destruction near Baton Rouge, where she had gone for the purpose of co-operating with the land forces under Van Dorn. Her machinery is said to have been damaged on the trip, and she was blown up to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy.

At about seven o'clock on the morning of the same day that the Arkansas ran past the Yankee fleet, five of their gun boats came down and endeavored to cut the Arkansas from her moorings under our batteries. The effort was unsuccessful, and they were compelled to hasten down the river, two of their boats having been severely damaged by our guns.

Nothing of interest transpired from that time until the 25th of July, 1862, when the two fleets retired, having accomplished nothing more than keeping eight or ten thousand men idle at that point.

It was during this siege that the Confederate troops discovered the comparative harmlessness of mortar shells. Heretofore these missiles had been looked upon with great awe by our army. The gunboat panic also died away at this time, it having been found by long experience that they were not half so formidable as fear had pictured them.

During this siege, which lasted six weeks, the entire number of shells thrown from the enemy's boats, were estimated at from 25,000 to 30,000. The casualties resulting from this large number were surprisingly small; there being but twenty-two soldiers killed and wounded, and one female and a negro killed. The female referred to was a most estimable lady named Mrs. Gamble, who had won the esteem of all who knew her, by her many amiable qualities, and among the soldiers was looked upon with great respect and friendship, for her constant and untiring kindness to them.

It was during the first siege of Vicksburg that the heroism of our Southern women was fully illustrated. On the morning of the 28th of June, when the enemy's fleet passed our batteries, going up the river, and shells were falling thick as hail in the streets of the city, crowds of ladies could have been seen on the "Court House," "Sky Parlor," and other prominent places in the city, gazing upon, as they termed it, the "magnificent scene."

On the departure of the United States fleet from Vicksburg, Gen. Breckinridge's division, together with the 4th Louisiana regiment, departed from Vicksburg for Baton Rouge.

Thus ended the first siege of Vicksburg, in which nothing was gained by the Confederate forces to have warranted the amount of consequence placed upon its successful defense. The enemy never attempted any attack by land on it, and the demonstrations of the fleet, even had they been successful, would have been of no avail without a corresponding success on the part of their land forces. It is true that the importance of the position was as much magnified in the North as it was in the South, and the failure to capture the city, made them as despondent as it made us rejoice.

CHAPTER II.

INTERIM BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND SIEGE.

After the departure of the enemy's fleet, business in a great measure resumed its wonted activity. Port Hudson having been occupied by the Confederate forces, had been fortified, thus giving us control of the river from that point to Vicksburg; trade revived with Red River, and steamboats regularly arrived. It was at this time that the city should have been placed in a position to sustain a protracted siege, as there was always a sufficient supply of beeves in Texas to have enabled us to procure any number without difficulty; corn was also in abundance, and could have been bought cheap at that time.

Soon after the fatal battle of Corinth, Major Gen. Earl Van Dorn was removed from command, and Major Gen. Pemberton was placed in command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, and in consequence of his being out-ranked by both Gen. Van Dorn and Gen. Lovell, was soon after appointed a Lieutenant General. With almost an unanimous voice, his appointment to such a responsible position was the subject of regret. It had been known that Gen. Pemberton was in favor of evacuating all points held by our forces on the water, and had actually recommended the destruction of the works in Charleston harbor, and the evacuation of the city. It was, therefore, a matter of great surprise, when it was announced that he was appointed to command a place that, since the fall of Memphis, had been universally acknowledged as one of the most important positions in the Confederacy. Gen. Pemberton was not a man that had won a name for capacity during the war. He had never been on a battle-field, and bore no reputation as a commander. And here it was that the President made the only grave error that has given cause to censure his administration.

During the time that elapsed from the departure of the enemy's fleet to the arrival of Lieutenant General Pemberton, sev-

eral additional batteries had been erected above the town, and breastworks had been thrown up from Chickasaw Bayou to Snyder's Bluff on the Yazoo river, which point had also been fortified, for the purpose of preventing the enemy's boats from ascending the river.

The number of guns mounted at this time, along the river, did not exceed eighteen, and of these not more than four or five were of large calibre.

On the arrival of Lieutenant General Pemberton, the people anticipated that immediate steps would have been taken to procure a number of the heaviest kind of guns, and that new batteries would have been immediately erected. To their utter astonishment the Lieutenant General remained in Jackson, and except an occasional visit, appeared to forget that such a place existed as Vicksburg. Absolutely nothing was done for the further defense of the city. Not a single additional gun was mounted, and no means whatever taken to strengthen our position, until after the battle of Chickasaw Bayou, when the Lieutenant General appeared for a moment to awake from his lethargy.

It was reasonably supposed, while we held possession of the river, from Port Hudson to Vicksburg, that prompt measures would have been taken to transport all the provisions possible from Louisiana and Texas to Vicksburg, but such was not the case. Boat after boat arrived, and nothing could be seen but sugar and molasses. Ostensibly all that arrived (or nearly all) was for the government, but if the assertions of many respectable men can be believed, such was not the case, for a great deal of it belonged to private individuals, who had it transported on government boats for a share of the profits accruing from its sale. The importance of provisioning Vicksburg was forgotten in the thirst for speculation.

In the month of December it was announced through the Northern press that Major General McClelland was entrusted with the opening of the Mississippi river, and although the people of Mississippi had become thoroughly disgusted with the gross mismanagement of the department, many believed that the warning would avail, and prompt measures would be taken to place Vicksburg in an efficient state of defense; but it was not so. Still the same apathy was evinced by Lieutenant General Pemberton, and nothing was done. This fact was well known to the press of Vicksburg, but from fear of its giving aid to the enemy, nothing was said in condemnation of the course pursued. Once or twice, when some disgraceful circumstance had occurred, the voice of censure would be heard; but as this was of rare occurrence, in this way the public outside of Vicksburg were led to believe that everything necessary had been performed for its defense. None supposed, with the fall of New Orleans before him, that Lieutenant General Pemberton would neglect to perform those duties apparent to the

meanest private in the army. To the disgrace of the country be it known, that the work of throwing up fortifications, provisioning the city, and procuring a proper supply of ammunition, was left solely to the superintendence of subordinate officers.

We strive in vain to find one single act of Lieutenant General Pemberton that can entitle him to praise. Everything that comes before us wears an aspect of incompetency; and from the facts before us we are compelled to say, that had a Lee, a Beauregard, a Bragg, or a Johnston been appointed to defend it, Vicksburg would never have fallen, as those Generals would never have been guilty of the gross ignorance that characterized the movements of Lieutenant General Pemberton.

There are five things that occurred in the control of his department, for which we look in vain for some excuse, whereby we can in some measure remove the responsibility from General Pemberton's shoulders. First. The cause of there not being enough provisions to have lasted a siege of six months, stored away in the city. Second. The neglect to reinforce Brigadier General Bowen with sufficient troops to hold the enemy in check until Johnston could arrive with reinforcements. Third. The cause of our fortifications around Vicksburg not being completed during the five months preceding the siege. Fourth. The reason of the works being so defective, that the damage done to them in the day, from the fire of the enemy, could not be fully repaired by a large force of laborers in the night. Fifth. The cause of our army remaining on the west of Big Black river, while the enemy were marching, with their rear exposed, towards Jackson, and the majority of our officers favored an advance movement; and why it was that the advance was not made when General Johnston ordered it. We look in vain for some excuse to palliate these errors, and are compelled, however reluctantly, to come to the conclusion, that it was through gross neglect of duty that Vicksburg was not provisioned largely; that it was through mismanagement that we lost the battle of Baker's Creek; that it was through incompetency that Bowen was not reinforced; that it was through a proper want of skill and energy that the works around the city were not completed before our army fell back into Vicksburg; and that it was through a want of generalship that the enemy was allowed to march towards Jackson without General Pemberton promptly attacking him in the rear.

To every one of these errors, we find circumstances of so glaring a character that nothing said will ever satisfy the people that they were unavoidable. With respect to the provisioning of Vicksburg, we must emphatically deny that there was any difficulty in provisioning it. Many of the planters voluntarily offered their crops to the government for a small price, or *free of charge*. Among these are Col. Benson Blake, now in

the Confederate Army, Col. Auter, Dr. P. H. Cook, and others, all men of standing and respectability in the State; and a short time before the investment, a committee of three planters arrived in Vicksburg, with an offer from the planters of the Yazoo and Deer Creek districts, to give the government all their crops *free of charge*, if the officials at Vicksburg would haul it away. These gentlemen, on arriving, went from one quartermaster to the other, and from one commissary to the other, but each of the parties thus applied to, disclaimed being the proper one to receive their offer, and stated that they were unable to inform the committee who the proper person was. The committee, after using their best endeavors to find some one to deliver the offer to, and seeing that the utmost indifference was manifested by the parties to whom they tendered their offer, whether it was accepted or not, became disgusted and returned home.

With respect to the reinforcing of Bowen at Grand Gulf, we can only say that it was the almost unanimous opinion of our Generals that the battle of Vicksburg ought to have been fought there, and it is the general belief that had our entire army been massed at that point, we could have defeated Grant, and driven him into the river.

The battle of Baker's Creek, and the defect in our works around Vicksburg, will be referred to in another portion of this book.

CHAPTER III.

INTERIM BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND SIEGE.—(CONTINUED.)

During the period elapsing between the first and second siege, the city had assumed a busy appearance; numerous stores were opened, and business, in a great measure, resumed its wonted activity.

The entire strength of our river batteries, at this time, did not exceed twenty-three guns, mounted along a space of several miles from near the Village of Warrenton, to a place called Mint Spring, above the city. This small number of guns was inadequate to prevent the passage of the enemy's boats, as was afterwards proven by the safe running past of the *Queen of the West*, *Indianola*, *Monarch* and *Lancaster*, and the passage of the enemy's fleet of gunboats and transports, on the night of the twenty-second of April. While acknowledging that the number of guns was insufficient to prevent their passage entirely, we insist that had a proper degree of vigilance been exercised by the officers commanding our batteries, the enemy could never have succeeded in passing his boats without having at

least one-half of them destroyed; but no vigilance was exercised,—no discipline kept up among the officers; it was one constant scene of merriment among those who were not devotees to Bacchus, and one uninterrupted course of drunken brawls among those that were. Any quantity of officers, dressed up in all the toggery of gold lace and brass buttons, could be seen promenading the streets, and a civilian could scarcely enter a private residence without finding three or four of these gentry on a visit. So outrageous had this laxity of discipline become, that the press of Vicksburg was at last compelled to call attention to it. The censure had little or no effect, and the same course was pursued.

On the commencement of the month of December, the movements of the United States army plainly indicated that the storm, which had been so long gathering, would soon burst upon the devoted city, and the first intimation received was the landing of Sherman's corps on the Yazoo, and which resulted in the battles of the 28th, 29th and 30th of December, and known as the battles of Chickasaw Bayou, an account of which we will give in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLES OF CHICKASAW BAYOU.

Chickasaw Bayou is situated about three miles above Vicksburg, and is a low and swampy portion of the County of Warren, in Mississippi. When the Yazoo river rises and overflows its banks, the water runs over that section of the county, and forms the Bayou from whence its name is derived.

A long line of breastworks and rifle-pits had been built at this place, extending in a zigzag line from our river batteries, above Vicksburg, to the fortifications on the Yazoo river, near Snyder's Bluff. The position was of great natural strength, being largely intersected with creeks and swamps, and offered great impediment to the advance of hostile forces.

On the morning of the 28th of December, the enemy having landed commenced driving in our pickets, and threw forward a body of infantry to throw a pontoon bridge across a creek that lay between them and our works. The building of the pontoon was stoutly resisted for some time, but artillery having been brought to bear upon our men they were forced to retire, and the enemy crossed over that night. Skirmishing lasted all day, with few or no casualties to the Confederate forces.

On the morning of the 29th the enemy, in strong force, ad-

vanced on our works, with the intention of storming them.— They marched up with great regularity and firmness to the charge, and as soon as they arrived within one hundred yards from our works, gave a cheer and rushed on. They were gallantly met by our forces under Brigadier General, now Major General, Stephen D. Lee, of South Carolina, composed of a brigade of Louisianians, and after a severe engagement repulsed with great slaughter. Our army, a few days previous, had been reinforced by General Stephenson, with a division composed of Tennesseans, Georgians and Alabamians, who aided greatly in repulsing the enemy. The fighting of the 28th and 17th Louisiana was of the most gallant character possible. Although this battle was the first one in which the 28th was engaged, and the first time they had been under fire, they withstood several severe assaults of the enemy, repulsing him each time, and holding their position throughout the day. The fighting of the 17th Louisiana was also splendid. Unaided, these gallant men, under the command of the brave Richardson, defeated and put to flight three full regiments of the enemy, led by Brig. General Blair of the United States army.

On the morning of the next day (the 30th) the enemy made a desperate assault on our right wing, with a body of picked men, numbering, it is estimated, from 8,000 to 10,000. They advanced with courage, and made the attack with spirit. Our forces met them with equal gallantry, and very soon a desperate struggle for mastery commenced. The enemy made desperate efforts to storm our lines, but was resisted with success by our forces. Three times he appeared upon the point of carrying the works, and as many times, by dint of great exertion and heroism, was driven back with heavy loss. The battle continued long and desperate. Wherever the danger was greatest, the gallant Lee could be seen urging on his men, and inspiring them with fresh courage. At last, a flank movement was made by our forces, sallying from the breastworks and attacking the enemy on his flank, routing him, and compelling him to leave some four hundred prisoners in our hands. This *coup de etat* put an end to the battle, the enemy having been punished too severely to attempt another assault. Soon after his defeat the enemy sent in a flag of truce, requesting permission to bury their dead. Under cover of this, many of the prisoners escaped.

Our loss in these battles did not exceed one hundred and twenty in killed and wounded. Among our killed was Captain Hamilton Paul, Assistant Adjutant General, on Brig. General S. D. Lee's staff. He was a young man of great promise, and had gained the esteem and friendship of all who knew him.

The loss of the enemy is roughly estimated at twenty-five hundred killed and wounded, and about four hundred prisoners. In the last day's battle we captured five stand of colors from

the enemy, as well as all the small arms left by them in their retreat.

After the battle of the 30th, no engagement of any magnitude took place; the next night the enemy re-embarked in their boats, and returned to Memphis.

CHAPTER V.

RETURN OF THE ENEMY.

Vicksburg is situated on the Mississippi river, about five hundred and thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico, and is built on a plateau of hills rising about two hundred feet above the water. These hills slope gradually upwards from the banks of the river, except in the upper portion of the city, where they rise precipitously and form cliffs, towering over the banks of the river.—Northward, above the city, are a tier of hills generally known as the “Walnut Hills.” The Mississippi river takes an abrupt turn at this point, forming a peninsula of that portion of Louisiana, opposite Vicksburg, for about two miles, when it makes another abrupt angle. Nine miles above this second curve in the river, the Yazoo empties itself. The rear of the city is a succession of hills, and the general feature of the country is broken and largely intersected with ravines. It is also greatly cut up by bayous and creeks, formed by the rain and overflow of the numerous springs which are to be found over the whole country.

Below Vicksburg, at Warrenton, the country is low and marshy for about six hundred yards from the banks of the river, when it makes an abrupt rise, forming a line of almost mountainous heights.

The country around Vicksburg is very fruitful. Large crops of cotton were usually made, and at the time we are speaking of, a very extensive crop of corn and other cereals had been planted. A large quantity of corn and bacon fell into the hands of the enemy on their march to Vicksburg; so large, in fact, that from Gen. Grant's official report, the entire Yankee army subsisted for eight days on what they found in the different plantations around Vicksburg, and during the entire siege their horses and mules used no other corn but that of the surrounding planters.

From the time the attack on our works on Chickasaw Bayou was made, to the return of the enemy, but little or nothing was done to strengthen our position. The fortifications in the rear of the city were commenced, but progressed slowly. It was

not anticipated that they would be required, but to use the words of a prominent officer there, were "only thrown up to satisfy the public." In another portion of this book we will make further remarks on the line of defenses that encircled Vicksburg.

On the 22d of January, 1863, intelligence was received that fifty gunboats and transports had passed Greenville, coming down, and the following day a large fleet laden with troops arrived at the bend of the river above Vicksburg, known as "Young's Point." As soon as the boats arrived, the enemy landed on the Louisiana shore, at a place called "White's Plantation," which in a few hours became dotted with tents. The gigantic plan of cutting a canal through the lower end of the peninsula was then put in motion, with what success we shall hereafter relate. No demonstration was attempted against the city, until the morning of the 1st of February, when the ram Queen of the West ran past the batteries in open daylight.

CHAPTER VI.

RUNNING OF THE BATTERIES BY THE RAM QUEEN OF THE WEST.

At about half past four o'clock on the morning of the 1st of February, a black smoke was observed moving slowly down the river, and shortly after, one of the enemy's cotton-clad rams, which was afterwards discovered to be the *Queen of the West*, was seen turning the point above the city. Not a shot having been fired at her, she slowly continued her course, and had almost got out of range of the water batteries above the city, known as the "Mint Spring battery," before a gun was fired. Just as she was on the point of going round the bend, the guard gave the alarm, and the water battery opened on her. Only a few rounds were fired, when she steamed across the river, and hugged the Mississippi shore, thus getting out of range of the water battery. From the great height of the hill batteries, the guns could not be depressed sufficiently to bear upon the ram, until she had gone some distance. At that time no guns had been mounted in front of the city, so that she continued her course without receiving any material damage, until she had arrived opposite where the hull of the steamer "Vicksburg" lay, when, reversing her engines, she made a dash at the boat with the intention of sinking it, her officers being under the impression that we were building a gunboat. The current of the river caused her to sheer off without doing any damage to the boat. She immediately tacked about, and was about to repeat

the blow, when a shot from one of our batteries near the railroad depot struck her on the prow, evidently causing some damage, as she relinquished her purpose, and continued her way down the river.

The batteries by this time were in full play, and belched out a constant and rapid stream of shot and shell, but without any effect, as the most of the balls fell short of the boat. The *Queen of the West* steamed slowly down the river; and in a few minutes had safely passed out of range of our lower batteries. That she had sustained some injury was evident, as she remained several days moored up to the Louisiana shore, receiving repairs. Reports from the United States say that she was struck eleven times.

The neglect of duty in permitting the *Queen of the West* to turn the point above the city before a shot was fired at her, and the dilatory manner in which all the batteries acted, raised a cry of indignation among the citizens of Vicksburg, who were well aware of the cause. The statement that we now give, was witnessed by the author, who can vouch for its truth. As soon as the first gun was fired from our batteries on the ram, a party of men, wearing the uniform of officers, were seen issuing from a building on Washington street, known as the "Apollo Hall." This building is a theater, the rooms of which are constantly open. The men referred to were officers in command of our batteries, who had been in this building all night on a drunken spree.

The same day that the *Queen of the West* passed our batteries, ten deserters from the 31st Wisconsin regiment, came across the river and reported Grant's army as numbering from 50,000 to 60,000 men. They also stated that great dissatisfaction existed among the troops on the peninsula, the majority of them being desirous of returning to Memphis. These statements, coming from deserters, did not gain much credit.

CHAPTER VII.

PASSAGE OF THE INDIANOLA AND HER CAPTURE.

A few nights after the running of our batteries by the *Queen of the West*, a black object was descried moving down the river. The night was extremely dark, so dark in fact that the peninsula opposite our batteries could scarcely be distinguished. Our guns, however, opened fire on the object, but without being able to take aim with any accuracy. After firing a few rounds our guns ceased, there being an opinion among the officers that

the object seen was nothing but a tree floating down the river. Two or three days after it was discovered to be the iron-clad gunboat *Indianola* that had passed down.

The *Queen of the West* had, by this time, been captured by our batteries on Red River. She was soon repaired, and starting up to Vicksburg with the ram *Webb* and gunboat *Beatty*, effected the destruction of the *Indianola*. The battle that took place between her and the Confederate boats was a short but spirited one. The immense superiority in strength, and the size of her guns, gave the *Indianola* a physical advantage over her opponents, which were wooden boats.

The *Indianola* had been chased up the river, to a short distance above Grand Gulf, when she stopped and offered battle. The challenge was quickly accepted. Our little fleet advanced in the following manner: The *Queen of the West* first, the *Webb* second, and the *Beatty* bringing up the rear. The *Queen of the West* ran rapidly past the *Indianola*, pouring a broadside into her, but without effect. The *Webb*, reversing her engines, made a dart upon the *Indianola*, striking her full on the stern, below water mark. The *Indianola* had been making a gallant resistance all the time, but on being pierced by the ram of the *Webb*, commenced sinking rapidly. She then struck her colors and surrendered to the Confederate fleet. Her officers and crew were transported to the *Beatty*, and soon after sent to Vicksburg.

All the damage sustained by our little fleet, was the twisting of the *Webb's* ram, in her endeavor to extricate herself from the *Indianola* after striking her. All effort to save the *Indianola* was unavailing, and she now lies sunk in twenty feet of water. The loss in killed and wounded on both sides, during the engagement, was small.

CHAPTER VIII.

CUTTING THE CANAL—YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION—SECOND SHELLING OF VICKSBURG.

While these events were transpiring, Grant was hard at work cutting a Canal through the peninsula. The work was prosecuted with great vigor, day and night, for nearly two months, without accomplishing the desired object, namely: the turning of the current of the Mississippi river. It was stated, by deserters, that not less than six thousand soldiers and negroes were kept constantly at work widening the ditch and making it

deeper, but without any effect, as not more than three or four feet of water entered the Canal.

Finding this project a failure, the Yazoo pass expedition was undertaken, but that also resulted in a failure, the enemy being repulsed at "Fort Pemberton" by the Confederate forces under Major General Loring. Although this movement may be regarded as a portion of the operations against Vicksburg, but few notes were taken by us, hence the meagre account we give.

Having been repulsed in their Yazoo pass exhibition, the enemy's boats returned in the early part of March, and on the ninth day of that month, two of their gunboats steamed down to the Louisiana shore, on the west side of the peninsula, and commenced throwing shells in the city; nearly all of them, however, fell short, and those that did fall in the streets did no damage to the soldiers or citizens.

On the same day, two dredge boats were observed for the first time in the canal. Our canal batteries opened fire as soon as they were perceived, and, after a sharp cannonading, compelled the enemy to remove the boats. The fire from our battery, bearing upon the mouth of the canal, was then kept up constantly, with great effect, the enemy being prevented from working the boats.

During this week, large bodies of Federal troops were observed massing on the Louisiana shore, opposite Warrenton, and the idea became strong, that the long looked-for offensive movement was at last in progress.

CHAPTER IX.

OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF.

A short time before the naval engagement at Port Hudson, which resulted in the passage of the United States steamers, *Hartford* and *Albatross*, the town of Grand Gulf was occupied by the Confederate forces, under Brigadier General Bowen, and a battery of six guns mounted on the banks of the river. A line of breastworks had also been made around the position.

Grand Gulf is situated on the East bank of the Mississippi river, immediately below the mouth of the Big Black river. Southeast of Grand Gulf is Port Gibson, and below Grand Gulf, Northwest of Port Gibson, on the banks of the river, is Bruinsburg.

The position at Grand Gulf was defended by two brigades of Missouri and Arkansas volunteers, under Brigadier General Bowen, of Missouri. This officer, a native of Georgia, but for

many years an adopted son of Missouri, was one of the bravest officers in the Confederate army, and his fighting qualities had won for him a favorable name throughout the Confederacy. This gallant man, having passed unscathed through the siege of Vicksburg, died at Clinton on his way from Vicksburg to Brandon, Mississippi, on the 24th of July, 1863, from a disease contracted during the siege. His gallantry and ability as an officer had just been rewarded by a Major General's commission.

The position at Grand Gulf was naturally strong; and but for the flank movement of the enemy, and the want of reinforcements, could have been held for an indefinite period.

CHAPTER X.

ATTEMPTED PASSAGE OF THE RAMS, LANCASTER AND MONARCH.

On the morning of the 25th of March, two of the enemy's rams, afterwards ascertained to be the *Lancaster* and *Monarch*, made an attempt to pass our batteries. For the first time, everything was prepared for them; and as soon as they commenced turning the bend of the river above the city, our batteries opened a terrific fire. At the same moment, two buildings on the crest of the peninsula were set on fire by our pickets, and, the light spreading a ray across the river, gave our gunners full view of the two boats. With increased rapidity, solid shot was hurled at them, but they calmly and slowly continued their way, as if certain they could not be destroyed. Our men at the batteries worked with the determination that they should not run the gauntlet uninjured, and redoubled their energies. It was apparent to the spectators, that both boats had been struck; but as they still steamed on their way, it was not believed that the damage done was of any consequence.

This engagement was a grand and magnificent spectacle. The day was just breaking, and the mimic thunder from our guns, the flash of light as they were fired, the piercing scream of the missiles as they sped through the air, blended with the soft light of the breaking day, and formed one of the greatest pyrotechnical displays ever witnessed.

The boats proceeded slowly down the river, followed by a constant stream of shot and shell from our batteries, but still they steamed down as if unhurt. A deep feeling of humiliation pervaded the spectators and men at the batteries, and curses loud and deep were spoken. At last, just as one of them came opposite our batteries at the railroad depot, a well aimed shot

from a ten-inch gun pierced her, and she ceased moving. In a few moments, she commenced to sink amid the cheers of the gunners and the crowd that were looking on. The *Lancaster*, for that was the name of the ram, continued slowly sinking for about fifteen minutes, when she careened, and soon nothing was seen but a dark speck on the water to denote what had become of the once boastful and defiant enemy. As soon as she commenced sinking, her officers and crew took to her boats and escaped to the peninsula, but nothing else was saved from her.

The remaining ram, the *Monarch*, having been struck repeatedly, soon became disabled, but not enough to sink her. She slowly floated down the river, under a heavy fire from our lower batteries, and, in a few minutes, had passed out of range. As soon as she had escaped the fire of our batteries, the *Albatross*, which had come up from Port Hudson with the *Hartford*, met and towed her to the landing on the Louisiana shore, opposite Warrenton. The damage done to this boat was of so severe a nature, that new machinery had to be transported across the peninsula for her; and it took several days before she could be repaired.

The damage done to these two boats, in this attempt to pass our batteries, fully sustained the opinion that we could always inflict great injury on the enemy in these demonstrations, if the necessary amount of vigilance was exercised by the officers commanding our batteries. The result of this engagement, in such glaring contrast with that of the *Queen of the West*, became a subject of remark; and all in Vicksburg anticipated that henceforth the officers would dispense with frivolities, and recollect they were engaged in war with the enemy then before them.

CHAPTER XI.

FAILURE OF THE CANAL—CHANGE OF PLANS.

Strenuous efforts had, meantime, been made by the Federals to succeed in their canal, but the "Father of Waters" remained obstinate, and would not consent to "change his base." Finding all efforts fruitless, the work was abandoned; and, the enemy despairing of capturing Vicksburg, decided upon abandoning their operations, and returning to Memphis. Preparations were made for their departure, and all their tents struck, when Major General Thomas, Adjutant General of the United States, and a renegade Southerner, arrived at Big Black. He immediately countermanded the order to return, and formed a plan which resulted in the downfall of Vicksburg.

This plan was to run a fleet of transports pass the batteries, and cross troops from the Louisiana shore below Vicksburg to Mississippi, and then march their army through the country to the rear of Vicksburg. This plan, although the most dangerous of all yet conceived, and apparently the fruits of despair, was adopted, and a move on Vicksburg was immediately resolved upon. On the night of the 22d of April, the first demonstration was made in accordance with the newly-formed plan by the running pass our batteries of three gunboats and seven transports, an account of which we will give in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

PASSAGE OF THE ENEMY'S FLEET, AND ATTACK ON GRAND GULF.

This successful demonstration, while it does credit to the enemy, reflects the deepest dishonor on the Confederate arms. Repeated warnings had failed to impress upon the minds of our officers the fact that that time was not one intended for mirth and revelry. They still continued to pursue the course which had been the subject of censure; and on the night the enemy's fleet passed down, a large number of officers were attending a ball given in the city, and not until our upper batteries opened fire, were they aware of the proximity of the enemy's fleet.

The passing of our batteries by the enemy, took place on Wednesday night, the 22d of April, at about half past twelve o'clock. At this hour the Yankee fleet, consisting of three gunboats and seven transports, was observed moving down the river. Our pickets, on the peninsula opposite, promptly gave the alarm, and at the same time set fire to two buildings in De Soto,—the name of the village on the peninsula,—for the purpose of illuminating the river. From some cause unknown, the fire burned badly. Instead of issuing in a bright blaze, it sent up a dense smoke which enveloped the river, and, with the exception of one beam reflected across the river, completely obscured the boats. Our guns, however, opened a heavy fire on them, but without doing any damage of consequence. One small boat was set on fire and burnt in front of the city, but the others, aided by the darkness, and the unusually random firing of our men, succeeded in passing safely.

The fleet, after getting out of range of our guns, which, by this time, was increased to the number of twenty-eight, moved to the Louisiana shore, opposite Warrenton, where they remained for three or four days. We own that there was many obsta-

cles to our preventing the enemy from making the passage, but give it as our opinion that considerable more damage could have been done to them had the officers been at their post.

We omitted to mention in our description of the passage of the fleet, that all the transports were protected by bales of Cotton and Hay lashed to both sides, and almost obscuring the boats. This was another drawback to our doing any damage, for we had not the means at our disposal to set the Cotton and Hay on fire.

As soon as the enemy's fleet had passed, the Yankee plan of campaign became fully developed, and all anticipated an attack on Grand Gulf. In confirmation of this belief, on the 28th day of April, the fleet, having previously gone down the river, attacked our batteries at that place. An engagement between the gunboats and our land batteries then took place, and after lasting for six and a half hours, the enemy retired, foiled in his attempt to silence them. Our loss on that day was twelve killed and wounded. Among the former was Col. Wade, Chief of Artillery for Bowen's division, and a gallant officer.

The next day the enemy's fleet, consisting of two gunboats and six transports, lashed together, ran past the batteries under a terrific fire, but which did them but little damage, our guns not being large enough. They then proceeded down until they came to the Louisiana shore, opposite Bruinsburg, Miss. The enemy's troops had previously been marched through Louisiana to the vicinity of St. Joseph, opposite Bruinsburg. They were then transported across the river, numbering, as was estimated by themselves, between fifty thousand and sixty thousand men. To oppose this force, Brigadier General Bowen's command did not exceed three thousand. The brigades of General Baldwin from Smith's division, and Colonel, now Brig. Gen., Reynolds from Stephenson's, were placed at his disposal as reinforcements, but remained in Vicksburg until called for.

CHAPTER XIII.

LANDING OF THE ENEMY AND BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.

Bruinsburg, Mississippi, is situated on the banks of the Mississippi river, about twelve miles below Grand Gulf, and at the mouth of BAYOU PIERRE. At this point the enemy landed between fifty and sixty thousand men on the 30th of April, and prepared for an advance movement.

As soon as General Bowen received information of their landing, he crossed Bayou Pierre and advanced towards Port Gib-

son, situated several miles southeast of Grand Gulf. In the vicinity of this place, General Bowen met the enemy advancing in full force, and immediately prepared for battle, having previously telegraphed to Vicksburg for reinforcements.

The enemy, confident in numbers, advanced with spirit and resolution, hoping to crush our small force with superior numbers. Their assaults were gallantly met by our men, and each attack repulsed. The battle raged with great fury, until about the middle of the day, when our forces, worn out by their almost superhuman exertions, were about to fall back. The enemy perceiving their exhaustion pressed them heavily, and would have eventually broke our line but for the timely arrival of Baldwin's brigade from Vicksburg. These gallant men, tired and exhausted as they were, after a forced march of over twenty miles, were ordered to advance to the support of Bowen. They advanced in splendid order, and with loud yells double quicked to the battle field. The Missourians and Arkansians observing them made renewed exertion, and recovered a part of the ground they had lost during the day. At about three o'clock the battle was raging with awful fury. Our men, as if inspired with demoniac strength, fought with a desperation unknown before.— Large bodies of the enemy could be seen making a flank movement, and fresh troops were thrown on our line of battle as fast as others were repulsed. In the early part of the engagement, Wade's battery of Virginia Artillery was captured by the enemy, but in the evening a determined charge, made by Green's brigade of Missouri and Arkansas troops, recaptured the lost guns, and brought them safely off. The battle raged with great violence until nightfall, when darkness put an end to the contest, neither party laying claim to a victory.

The loss on both sides was very heavy, and our casualties were greatly disproportioned to the number of men engaged, our total loss having exceeded one thousand out of about six thousand effective men. The loss of the enemy was estimated, by those present, at between four and five thousand in killed, wounded and captured.

As soon as the fighting ceased, General Bowen sent in a flag of truce to General Grant, requesting his permission to bury that portion of our dead that lay in his lines. The demand was refused by Grant, who promised, however, that our dead should be buried, and our wounded well cared for.

That night, no reinforcements arriving as was expected, the Confederate army fell back and crossed Bayou Pierre, burning the bridges after them. The retreat was conducted with order and regularity, every effective man being brought off safely, except one company of Mississippians, left by mistake. They were captured, but afterwards made their escape and rejoined their regiment. Col. Pettus, of the 20th Alabama, now Brigadier General, was also taken prisoner, but made his escape by a ruse.

On the morning after the Confederate army retreated from Port Gibson, the enemy commenced throwing pontoons across the creek, and skirmishing lasted all day. Towards evening, information was brought to General Bowon that the enemy was landing above Grand Gulf, with the intention of cutting him off from Vicksburg. The gallant Major General Loring had arrived at Bowen's headquarters by this time, but without any troops; the order to reinforce having been given at too late an hour for them to arrive with him. A council of war was immediately held, and it was unanimously determined to evacuate the position, as from the disparity of numbers, and the want of rations and ammunition, it could not be held for twenty-four hours.

In compliance with the resolution to evacuate, prompt measures were taken. Everything was destroyed that could not be removed—the guns spiked and the magazines blown up. Our army then rapidly fell back to the Big Black; and, crossing the river at Baldwin's Ferry, formed a junction with the main body of our army under Lieutenant General Pemberton.

CHAPTER XIV.

MARCH OF THE ENEMY TO JACKSON, AND BATTLE OF BAKER'S CREEK.

The position of the enemy, after the evacuation of Grand Gulf, was one of extreme peril. On one flank was Gen. Joseph E. Johnston with a force, whose strength was unknown to General Grant; and on the other was Lieutenant General Pemberton, with an army between 30,000 to 35,000 strong. To have remained at Grand Gulf would have ruined the Federal army; and with this knowledge Grant determined to make a feint movement on Pemberton, and by that means detain him on the West bank of the Big Black, while he marched rapidly on Jackson, Mississippi, with his entire force. The object of the Federal commander was to make sure of no enemy being in his rear when he marched on Vicksburg.

The ruse succeeded. Whether General Pemberton took any means of knowing what force the enemy had confronting him or not, we cannot tell; but this much we do know: that he remained on the West bank of the Big Black, near Bovina, Mississippi, with the main body of his army, until the evening of the 15th of May, when he received a telegram from General J. E. Johnston, ordering him to advance immediately and attack the enemy in the rear, while he (Johnston) would attack him in front with what forces he had.

It is said that Lieutenant General Pemberton was opposed to crossing the Big Black, preferring to await the advance of the enemy, but that he was overruled by the majority of his subordinate Generals. This statement is made in defence of his campaign; but we cannot see in what way it serves to remove the responsibility from his shoulders. The great error was in not advancing, on the 12th, when the rear of Grant's army was exposed to us, and offered every inducement for an attack. The idea of General Pemberton desiring to advance after the enemy had penetrated into the country, and cut him off from the river, for the purpose of starving him out, was a gigantic error, as, from General Grant's official report, there was enough provision found in the country through which he marched to have supplied his army for three months; besides which, Vicksburg would have been left in a very exposed position by such a movement.

A majority of the general officers having decided, on the receipt of General Johnston's dispatch to advance and attack the enemy, preparations were made to move forward, and on the 15th of May, the Confederate army took up its line of march, the troops being positioned as follows:

Major General Stephenson's division, composed of the brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Lee, Barton and Cummings, and Colonel, now Brigadier General Reynolds, in front; General Loring's division, composed of the brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Tilghman, Featherstone, and others, in the centre; and Bowen's division, composed of two brigades under Brigadier General Green and Colonel Cochran. There was also one brigade commanded by Brigadier General Baldwin, detached from Major General M. L. Smith's division, Waul's legion of Texians and Wirt Adam's Cavalry regiment, the whole making an effective force of between 23,000 and 26,000 fighting men.

The Confederate army marched that day to Baker's Creek, no one being aware of the close proximity of the enemy, who, having intercepted the dispatch ordering Pemberton to advance, divided his forces, and, marching rapidly with one body on Jackson, drove Johnston across Pearl river, and marched the other towards Big Black, for the purpose of surprising Pemberton. On the evening of the 15th of May, the Confederate army moved forward in the same position as they occupied the day before; and, after marching some distance, discerned a thick line of the enemy's skirmishers. The army immediately fell back to Baker's Creek, and, the enemy following, prepared to give battle. The troops bivouacked that night on the battlefield. All the pickets thrown out that night by our forces, consisted of a few cavalry on the roads, while our flank and rear were left entirely unprotected. The next morning skirmishing commenced, and the artillery of Stephenson's division was or-

dered to advance and open fire. In compliance with this command, the different batteries advanced and unlimbered their pieces. As soon as the gunners had taken their proper places and opened fire, a terrific volley of musketry was poured in upon them by a large body of the enemy concealed in the woods not fifty yards distant, which killed and wounded a large number of the gunners and horses. The fighting then became severe, and resulted in the repulse of our infantry, who, having but little or no artillery support, were compelled to meet the attacks of the enemy unsupported. In a few hours, nearly the whole of Stephenson's artillery was captured, and the enemy, advancing on his flank, soon broke the different brigades. The men of this division fought with great courage and determination, but were compelled to fall back before overwhelming numbers.

Sometime after the firing commenced, Major General Loring's division moved rapidly forward, and was advancing to attack the enemy, when a battery of light artillery, commanded by one Captain Cowan, of Vicksburg, was subjected to the same terrific fire from the enemy's infantry, killing nearly all the horses, and placing *hors de combat* a majority of the gunners. The guns were immediately taken by hand and hauled a considerable distance, but were finally left in a swamp, from which they could not be extricated.

General Loring, perceiving that Stephenson had lost all his artillery, and that his infantry, after making a stubborn resistance, was compelled to retreat, leaving his flank exposed, determined to cut his way through to Jackson, where he could be of greater service to the Confederacy than falling back to Vicksburg. Accordingly, the division was ordered to cross the creek to the right of where the enemy was posted in large numbers. The movement was made with celerity and dispatch, but not before the gallant Brigadier General Floyd Tilghman, of Fort Henry renown, had met his death wound while bravely fighting. His body was carried to Vicksburg, where it was interred in a garden.

After crossing the creek and moving off on the enemy's right flank, we are unaware what movement was made by General Loring that enabled him to escape with safety, but from the nature of the country and the large force of the enemy, we must acknowledge that his safe escape, with his entire division, was one of the most brilliant feats of the war, and displayed, on the part of Major General Loring, military skill of high order.

While this movement was being made by Loring's division, the forces under Brigadier General Bowen moved quickly forward on the right, and met the enemy just as Stephenson's division was rapidly falling back. General Bowen rapidly threw his brigades in front, and then commenced one of the most desperate struggles recorded this war. The entire force under

General Bowen did not exceed five thousand, and opposed to him was a force, variously estimated, at from forty to sixty thousand men. Our line of battle was rapidly formed, and the attack of the enemy awaited. Then it was that McPherson's entire corps advanced on this small body of troops, and endeavored, by force of numbers, to crush them. Each charge was met with almost superhuman courage, and repulsed. The Missouri troops fought like demons, with the hope of retrieving the day and gaining a victory. So desperately did this division fight, that had there been anything like organization among Stephenson's division, and they had supported Bowen, the battle might have been won. But there was nothing like order among the majority of Stephenson's division. They had, after fighting for several hours with the most determined courage without artillery, and against overwhelming odds, been overpowered, and were straggling in a demoralized condition towards Big Black. In justice to the gallant Major General Stephenson and his subordinate Brigadier Generals, we would say, that every exertion was made on their part to rally the men, but with little success. The brunt of the battle then fell on Bowen's division and the few men of Stephenson's force, who remained intact.

Several desperate charges were made by these troops on the enemy, but, from the large numbers brought against them, without success. One of these charges was made by Gen. Green's brigade of Missouri and Arkansas troops, not numbering over eleven hundred men. These heroes advanced with the utmost coolness upon the enemy's forces, consisting of two batteries of artillery, supported by an entire division. They charged up to within thirty yards of the artillery, when the Yankee gunners, who were laying aside of their pieces, drew the string attached to the friction primers, discharging their guns, and poured in such a severe volley of canister, as to compel our men to fall back. So gallantly did these troops behave themselves that Major General McPherson, in conversation after the fall of Vicksburg, is reported to have said, in reference to this charge, that he almost "thought it a sin to fire on such brave men."

Lieutenant General Pemberton is reported to have lost all confidence after the capture of our artillery. He is said to have crossed the bridge over Baker's Creek, exclaiming to those around him, "I call upon you, gentlemen, to witness that I am not responsible for this battle—I am but obeying the orders of General Johnston." The battle was, in fact, fought without any one commander. It was left to the Major and Brigadier Generals to do their best, and which they did; but, from want of a general co-operation, effected nothing.

About dusk the Confederate army fell back towards the line of works erected on the Big Black river. In the retreat almost every step of the way was contested by the gallant Bowen and

his brave men; every endeavor on the part of the enemy to flank us, being repulsed with heavy loss. Our forces arrived in safety to the works, which they immediately occupied with what troops remained in any state of organization, while the enemy, evidently exhausted at the determined resistance given him by our troops during the day, made no demonstration that night.

Our total loss in the battle did not exceed six thousand in killed, wounded and missing, while that of the enemy could not have been less than ten thousand. This great disparity in casualties, arose from the nature of the ground preventing any large line, and the enemy being compelled to mass his troops in dense columns, when making a charge, the fire from our infantry into their serried ranks was very destructive.

Our loss in artillery was large, not less than thirty pieces having been captured. Among the different batteries were:

Co. A.—Withers' 1st Mississippi Artillery, .2 pieces.

Cowan's of " " " " ...6 "

Co. C.— " " " " ...6 "

Botetourt (Virginia) Artillery,6 "

Wofford's of Withers' 1st Miss. Artillery, ..4 "

We are unable to name the other batteries captured on this day. Nearly the whole of Stephenson's was captured. One of his brigades succeeded in bringing off its artillery safely, and that was a brigade of Tennesseans, commanded by Colonel, now Brigadier General, Reynolds. This gallant officer acted with great skill from the evacuation of Grand Gulf to the fall of Vicksburg. On the retreat from Grand Gulf, he was placed in command of the entire baggage train, and although the enemy twice got in his rear, he eluded them each time, and succeeded in bringing the wagons across Big Black without the loss of one.

The retreat from, and yielding up of the field, put an end to the battle. It cannot be denied that this engagement resulted in a most disastrous defeat to our arms, and one that could have resulted differently had competent generalship been displayed.

CHAPTER XV.

BATTLE OF BIG BLACK.

On Sunday morning, 17th May, (the day after the battle of Baker's Creek) the enemy advanced in force against the works erected on the Big Black. (These works were erected on the East side of the river, with the object, it is said, of defending two bridges, and of protecting Snyder's Bluff.) The attack on our right and left was repulsed, but a panic breaking out in a

brigade on the centre, the men deserted their works and left the line exposed. As soon as the enemy perceived this they commenced pouring over the deserted works, thus compelling our right and left to fall back, which they did rapidly. Nearly all the artillery saved the day before was lost here, among which was two batteries belonging to Bowen's division, which, for want of horses, could not be removed in time. Our army then retreated towards the river, and, after crossing, set the bridge on fire. This, for a while, impeded the pursuit of the enemy, who were compelled to build pontoons before they could cross the river.

Our loss in this engagement was about 1,000, in killed, wounded and missing. A large number of small arms and knapsacks were thrown away by our men in their precipitate retreat from the breastworks. The retreat across the Big Black ended the engagement—an engagement that can scarcely be dignified with the name of battle.

CHAPTER XVI.

RETREAT FROM BIG BLACK TO VICKSBURG.

Soon after crossing Big Black, our army became a demoralized body of men; no order or discipline was observed during the march; the men were scattered for miles along the road.—The sight of such a large body of men, retreating in the disorder that they were, was enough to create a panic in the strongest mind. A feeling of despondency could be observed among the troops, and curses, loud and deep, were hurled at Lieutenant General Pemberton for his mismanagement of the army—many of the troops declaring their willingness to desert rather than serve under him again.

At about ten o'clock on Sunday night, the main body of the Confederate forces commenced entering Vicksburg, and then ensued a scene that almost beggars description. Many planters, living near the city, with their families, abandoned their homes and entered our lines with the Confederate forces. We were among the troops when they entered, and never in our life beheld anything to equal the scene. As if by magic, the stillness of the Sabbath night was broken in upon, and an uproar, in which the blasphemous oath of the soldier, and the cry of the child, mingled and formed a sight which the pen cannot depict. It was a scene, which, once beheld, cannot be forgotten. There were many gentle women and tender children, torn from their homes by the advance of a ruthless foe, and compelled to fly to

our lines for protection ; and mixed up with them, in one vast crowd, were the gallant men who had left Vicksburg three short weeks before, in all the pride and confidence of a just cause, and returning to it a demoralized mob and a defeated army, all caused through one man's incompetency.

CHAPTER XVII.

INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG.

On the arrival of our army within the fortifications at Vicksburg, prompt measures were taken to gather the men together and re-organize the demoralized body of men. Our officers worked hard, and, by two o'clock on Monday afternoon, had succeeded in placing the troops in position behind the breast-works.

On Sunday, Snyder's Bluff and Chickasaw Bayou were evacuated, and the troops brought to Vicksburg. The works on Snyder's Bluff consisted of about sixteen heavy guns, of which number six were brought away, our forces not having time to remove the balance. A good deal of stores, heavy artillery, ammunition and baggage, were left at the above-named points for want of transportation.

The position occupied by the different divisions, were as follows : Major General M. L. Smith's division, composed of Brigadier Generals Shoup, Baldwin, Vaughn, and Buford's brigades, on the left ; Major General J. H. Forney's division, composed of Brigadier Generals Moore's and Hebert's brigades, in the centre ; Major General C. L. Stephenson's division, composed of Brigadier Generals Barton's, Cummings', and Lee's, and Colonel, now Brigadier General Reynolds' brigades, on the right ; and Brigadier General Bowen's division, composed of Brigadier General Green's and Colonel Cochran's brigades, held in reserve. • Waul's legion of Texas cavalry was dismounted, and served as infantry on Stephenson's line.

When our forces entered the city on Saturday night, our line of defences was not yet completed, and the men, tired and worn out as they were, after the privations, marchings and counter-marchings of the past fortnight, were immediately set to work on the fortifications. On Monday, at 12 meridian, they were completed, and the men took their positions to await the approach of the enemy.

At about two o'clock, the enemy's skirmishers appeared in front of our works and opened fire, but without doing any damage to the Confederate forces. By dusk they had planted sev-

eral batteries of artillery in position, about four hundred yards from our line, but abstained from using them. The sharp shooting was, however, continued until dark, when it ceased, and quiet reigned over the city and fortifications.

On Tuesday morning, by daylight, the enemy opened a terrific fire on our line of works, which was quickly responded to by our guns with fine effect; the enemy being compelled to shift his batteries several times. The enemy then endeavored to throw forward a body of sharpshooters, but a severe fire from our infantry drove them back, and prevented the execution of the design. Towards noon the enemy made their first attack on that portion of our line held by Brigadier Generals Shoup and Baldwin's brigades. They threw forward a large column, which, giving a loud cheer, charged upon the works. Our men withheld their fire until the Yankees had approached to within fifty yards, when they poured in a terrific and destructive volley of musketry, doing considerable execution in the serried ranks of the foe. The enemy wavered a moment, and their indecision giving our men time to reload; when they charged again they were met with a more galling fire than the first one, which caused them to break and retire precipitately behind the cover of the friendly hills. The loss of the enemy in this charge must have been severe, as the dead in front of our lines lay in large numbers. Our loss was very slight.

No other serious attack was attempted during the remainder of the day. The attack narrated above, was looked upon more as an endeavor to "feel" the strength of our forces, than to gain any important advantage. Artillery firing and sharpshooting continued for about three hours, when Lieutenant General Pemberton rode up and ordered our men to cease firing, as he desired no artillery duels. In obedience to this order the men ceased firing, but the order resulted very badly for us, as the next morning the enemy, emboldened by our silence, advanced their artillery one hundred yards nearer than they had them the day previous.

After their repulse in the morning, the enemy kept up a constant fire on our line from their artillery and sharpshooters, dismounting several of our guns, and compelling us to mask the remainder by hauling them from their position behind the works to the rear of the hills. The enemy evidently observed the effects of their fire; for as soon as a gun was removed from its position, or dismounted, they would send up a loud cheer of joy, much to the chagrin of our forces. In one instance, however, the laugh was turned on them by Brigadier General Louis Herbert, of Louisiana, who, observing the enemy taking particular aim at a fine Parrott gun on the right of his line, gave orders that as soon as a shell struck the parapet near the gun, and obscured it with dust, to remove the piece and make it appear as if it had been dismounted. A few minutes after the order was

given, a thirty-pound Parrott shell, from the enemy's gun, struck the parapet, completely enveloping the gun with dust. The piece was promptly removed, and as soon as the dust had cleared away, the enemy, not seeing it any more, set up a loud cheering, which was heartily responded to by our men, who enjoyed the ruse highly.

On Wednesday morning, May 20th, at about three o'clock in the morning, the enemy opened a terrific fire, from their artillery, upon our line. The fire was absolutely fearful. Shell after shell came in such rapid succession, that the air seemed alive with them. The noise made by their shrieks, the loud explosion when they bursted, and the silvery sound they made when the fragments were falling, created an uproar almost deafening. This severe cannonading lasted until nearly five o'clock, when it slackened down to an occasional shot. Firing continued slowly from their artillery for the balance of the day, while their sharpshooters increased their fire perceptibly.

Towards the middle of the day, the enemy's mortars, which had been placed in position opposite Vicksburg, opened on the city. These mortars were mounted on large rafts, constructed for the purpose, and lashed to the west bank of the peninsula on the Louisiana shore. A brisk fire was kept up by them until about four o'clock in the evening, when they ceased and remained silent until next morning.

On Thursday morning at three o'clock the enemy opened the same heavy fire as they had done the day previous, and kept it up for about a similar length of time, when it decreased, but not as much as before. During the day they continued firing, increasing its rapidity to some extent, while their sharpshooters swept our breastworks with a constant stream of minie balls. Several additional guns were also brought to bear upon us, their fire beginning to have some effect on our works.

The mortars on the peninsula opened fire in the morning and kept up a constant and rapid fire all day, but providentially injuring no one. The city at this time was filled with women and the only protection afforded them from the shells, was a number of caves built in the sides of the hills. General Pemberton had made several requests that they should quit the city, but without effect, as they declared themselves willing to risk the horrors of a siege rather than leave their homes.

Besides the residents of the city, there were many women and children, the families of planters, living near Vicksburg, who entered the city with our army on their retreat from Big Black. To their credit, be it said, that severe as was the hardships and sufferings they experienced, all these ills were endured uncomplainingly, their only desire being the successful defence of the city.

On the evening of the 21st, the enemy ceased firing from their artillery on our breastworks, but kept up a severe fire

from their sharpshooters all night; the mortars also shelled the city all night from the peninsula opposite.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE INVESTMENT—GENERAL ATTACK ON OUR WORKS, AND REPULSE OF THE ENEMY.

On Friday morning, the 22d of May, at about three o'clock, the enemy opened on the works, their fire exceeding, in severity, that of any previous morning. Every available gun appeared to have been brought to bear on our works, and the cannonading continued with unabated fury until eleven o'clock, when it suddenly ceased. This bombardment was the most terrible endured during the siege, and, we believe, the most terrific ever known in civilized warfare. Nothing could be heard but one continual shrieking of the shells, as they came cutting through the air, and the sharp fiz of the Minie balls as they came by hundreds whizzing past.

Notwithstanding the severity of this fire, the casualties were small—a fact which almost seems a miracle, as, from the exposed condition of our defences, the enemy had enfiladed us on all sides, and had gained on us a fire in reverse.

At eleven o'clock, as soon as the firing had ceased, the enemy were discovered forming a line of battle with heavy columns of infantry. It was in this instance that the bad policy of ordering our men to cease firing on the enemy's sharpshooters was observed. Had we kept up a fire on them during the days previous to this attack, they would have been compelled to keep at a further distance, and our gunners would have been able to open a severe fire upon the columns then forming in line of battle, and prevented the charge; but as it was, the sharpshooters, being allowed to come within one hundred yards of our position, kept up such a rapid and galling fire on our works, that the cannoneers could scarcely raise from their position to load their pieces. With these advantages in their favor, the enemy formed their line of battle, and advanced to the charge with but little or no resistance from our artillery.

At about noon, the enemy advanced steadily, and in good order, pouring in a volley, which did but little or no damage, our men being protected by the rifle-pits and breastworks, reserving their fire until the enemy had approached near enough to feel its effects. As soon as they had approached to a distance of about fifty yards from our line of entrenchments, our men rose from their reclining positions behind the works, and gave

them such a terrible volley of musketry, that they were compelled to fall back, which they did, however, in pretty good order. On the lines occupied by the brigades of Baldwin, Shoup, Hebert, Moore and Lee, the heaviest and most determined assaults were made.

The enemy, after being twice repulsed on Lee's line, were reinforced, and made a third charge. Force of numbers gained for them a momentary advantage, and several of their men entered our works, but the gallant and chivalrous Lee quickly rallied his men, and, after a severe fight, drove them back with immense loss. All of those who entered our line were shot. The enemy, foiled by the desperate fighting of the brave Georgians and Alabamians, made no further demonstration on this line of a like nature. Several charges were attempted, but each was repulsed, with great gallantry, by our men.

The charges on Moore's brigade were heavy and determined, but were all repulsed with great slaughter to the enemy. So desperate were the attacks, and so heroically were they made, that one of the enemy's flags was actually planted on the edge of the line of breastworks, occupied by the second Texas. The color-bearer who planted it was immediately shot dead by one of the men, and the colors captured. The Texans acted with their usual valor, and the Alabamians in this brigade behaved admirably, keeping up so galling a fire on the enemy as to prevent their approaching near the line occupied by them.

The fighting on Brigadier General Hebert's line was protracted and desperate, particularly on the immediate right and left of the Jackson road, occupied by the third and consolidated twenty-first and twenty-third Louisiana regiments. Their position was one which the enemy desired to obtain above all others, as, from the nature of the defences, had they carried the road, Vicksburg would have been lost. Several desperate charges were made on this line during the day, and had been successfully resisted. As often as the enemy were repulsed, they would return to the charge with fresh troops, and endeavor to carry the works; but the gallant men comprising the above-named regiments, held their ground manfully, and repulsed every attack.

The last charge on the line occupied by the twenty-first and twenty-third Louisiana, was made by the seventeenth Wisconsin regiment, composed entirely of Irishmen, and bearing the green flag of Erin. With their entire front rank carrying scaling-ladders, they rushed upon the works and endeavored to scale them, the fortifications at that point being erected on a very precipitous hill. Three times they essayed to plant, but a sweeping fire from our infantry compelled them to face back. At the last charge, they approached within twenty yards of our works, but such a terrible volley was poured into their ranks, that they broke and retreated in confusion, leaving their dead

in large numbers lying in front of our line. The Mississippians in this brigade acted very handsomely, repulsing every charge made on their line.

The engagement on Shoup's line was conducted with the same bravery and success as on the others. The fighting on Baldwin's line was also severe, and was attended with the same success. On every portion of the line, the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss, although their attacks were not so desparately made on every portion as they were on those portions specially mentioned. Louisianians, Georgians, Alabamians, Mississippians, Texans and Tennesseans, behaved with the same valor and success. The service rendered by Bowen's division of Missourians and Arkansians, was signal and glorious. With their usual valor, they reinforced all points threatened by the enemy, and aided greatly in repulsing them.

The loss of the enemy in this day's engagement, could not have been less than from 8,000 to 10,000 in killed and wounded. Their dead lay in large numbers before our works, while thousands of wounded men were carried off as soon as they fell. Our total loss did not exceed eight hundred.

A description of this day's fight would be a task too difficult to undertake. It was a continual booming of artillery, and a constant rattle of musketry. As each charge was repulsed or made, the lines would resound with the loud yells of our men at their success, or the cheer of the enemy as he made the charge.

Nightfall presented a sad spectacle. Small as our loss had been, in comparison with that of the enemy, and the severity of the conflict, many of our best and bravest officers and soldiers had fallen—many of the noblest and most devoted patriots had yielded their life on the altar of their country, and had fought their last battle in defence of their cause.

While the battle was raging at the breastworks, an attack was made on our water batteries by the gunboats, and, after a short contest, they were repulsed, and did not renew the engagement again that day. The mortars also kept up a rapid fire on the city, but without any other effect than partially destroying two or three buildings.

During this tremendous bombardment throughout the day, stores in the city were opened as usual, and the streets promenade by women and children, as if no missiles of death were filling the air and bursting and scattering the fragments around. It was a miracle that so few were injured in the city that day. Nothing but the arm of Providence could have shielded the inhabitants from death.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONTINUATION OF THE INVESTMENT. BURIAL OF THE ENEMY'S DEAD.

The day following the general assault, and repulse of the enemy was ushered in with comparative silence by the enemy. Only an occasional shot was fired, and their sharpshooters relaxed their fire considerably. This gave great relief to our men, who were very much exhausted by the severe engagement of the day previous, and enabled them to move about behind the works, without running as much risk from the enemy's shells and bullets as before.

The enemy were evidently very much disheartened at the terrible repulse they had met with the day previous, and evinced no disposition to renew the attack; in anticipation of which, all the necessary preparations had been made. So humiliated was Grant at the successful defense made by our forces, deeming them, as he did, demoralized and broken in spirit, that he made no request to bury his dead. Many who were dangerously wounded remained in front of our works, groaning from pain and calling for help, without any one being able to come to their assistance. Our men would have assisted them, but the fire of the enemy prevented their showing themselves above the parapet. They were thus left to die through the inhumanity of their commander; but this brutal and unchristian spirit having been manifested so often by our foe, no one felt surprised at it.

Sunday morning at daylight the enemy opened fire on us from his Parrott and other guns, keeping it up all day without intermission, and continuing the fire all night. From the defective nature of our defences the casualties on our side began to grow larger, although strenuous exertions were made during the nights, by the Major and Brigdier Generals, to repair the works injured by the fire of the enemy, and to strengthen them sufficiently to meet any future cannonading. The line occupied by Brigadier Generals Hebert, Moore, Shoup and Baldwin's brigades was the particular object at which the enemy directed their fire; a majority of their guns being concentrated at this point.

The mortars on the peninsula opened a steady fire on the city until the afternoon, when they increased it, and poured in thirteen-inch shells with great rapidity until the following morning. The number of mortars by this time had been increased to five, and a party sent over the river at night, for the purpose of making observations, reported the enemy busily engaged constructing works for large siege guns.

On Monday morning, the 25th of May, the enemy opened the same heavy fire from their artillery and sharpshooters, until eleven o'clock, when they ceased. The reason for a cessation

of hostilities, was a flag of truce, which had been sent in by Lieutenant General Pemberton, offering an armistice until eight o'clock that evening, for the purpose of giving Grant an opportunity to bury his dead.

From the first engagement on Tuesday to this day, the enemy's dead, to the estimated number of three thousand, had remained on the field in front of our works, while many of their wounded, left by them in their precipitate retreat from the last charge on Friday, had died from want of proper attendance. One of their wounded, (a captain) after remaining on the ground in front of Shoup's line for nearly two days, was removed in the night by several noble-hearted men of our forces, who crossed over the rifle pits with a litter, at the imminent peril of their lives, and bore him safely within our works. On examination, it was found that his thigh was shattered by a ball, and mortification had ensued. Before he died he delivered some money and papers into the hands of the surgeons who attended him, with his name and address, and requested that after the siege was over they should be forwarded to his wife—a request that was honorably complied with. After lingering a short time he died.

The object of General Pemberton in making the offer to Grant to bury his dead was, to save our men from sickness. The dead bodies, beneath the influence of a burning sun, had become decomposed, and filled the air with an awful stench. From their proximity to our works, the men were considerably affected by the unwholesome air they were compelled to breathe, and great fears were entertained that it would result in an epidemic, unless some measures were taken to have the dead buried. Although our requesting Grant to bury his dead, was, in a measure, yielding somewhat to the enemy, the circumstances under which the deviation from dignity occurred, made the request perfectly right.

The offer for a cessation of hostilities for eight hours having been accepted, the dead were removed by a party detailed from our army, and carried to the enemy's picket lines, where they were buried. While the dead were being removed, many of our officers left our line, and going to the neutral ground, between the two armies, engaged the Federal officers in conversation. While out there, newspapers, and other small articles, were exchanged by our men for tobacco. The author of this work, in company with Dr. E. McD. Coffey, Chief Surgeon of Bowen's division, went out with the other officers, and held a conversation with a party of Federal officers, of about a half-hour's duration. They expressed themselves very much dissatisfied at the result of Friday's engagement, and observed that, from our repeated defeats, they had not anticipated any attempt on our part to hold the city. They, however, appeared confident in their ability to starve us out, and said, on our observing

that there was no chance of such a thing occurring: "Oh, we know that you cannot hold out longer than two months at furthest." On our remarking that we could hold out until Johnston advanced to our relief, they observed that we were depending on a broken reed, as they were well aware of the strength of our forces under Johnston, and they knew he had not men enough to attack them with; besides, said they, "we are looking for reinforcements daily, and they will arrive long before Johnston can organize an army, even if he intends doing so. Our reinforcements, with the aid of the Big Black river, will be ample to hold him in check until you are starved out."

As soon as the time agreed upon for a cessation of hostilities had expired, the enemy renewed their artillery firing and sharpshooting, but in a very feeble manner. The mortars on the peninsula in front of the city kept up a heavy fire, throwing their shells to the rear of our works, and by that way cross their fire with that of the besieging army in the rear.

The usual amount of firing continued on Tuesday, with little or no loss to the garrison, which by this time had become perfectly indifferent to the missiles falling continually around them. They had become so used to the shells bursting around them, that they were made rather a subject of jest than of fear. The only missiles from which they apprehended danger, were the hundreds of Minie balls constantly whizzing past them.

About this period the first courier that managed to elude the Federal army entered Vicksburg with dispatches from General Joseph E. Johnston to General Pemberton. On the receipt of the dispatch a circular was issued by the Lieutenant General commanding, giving a synopsis of the news, which was to the effect that "General Johnston was at Canton, Mississippi, with an organizing force;" that "he requested the Lieutenant General to hold out as long as he could, &c." It was also stated in the circular that a portion of General Bragg's army was ordered to General Johnston, and that they were then moving towards Jackson, Mississippi. The circular also gave our forces the first intelligence they had, from Southern sources, of the capture of Winchester by Lieutenant General Ewell, and the invasion of Pennsylvania.

As might be supposed, the receipt of this intelligence, with the hope of relief that it held out, lent new vigor to the garrison, and although they had already been reduced to quarter rations, they were cheerful, and evinced a fresh determination to hold the works until the siege could be raised by Johnston.

The firing from the peninsula on the city had perceptibly increased; eight mortars and siege guns were now playing on Vicksburg; the enemy had erected strong breastworks in front of our line in the rear of the city, and had brought a large number of guns to bear upon us, while the bombardment and sharpshooting continued unceasingly.

CHAPTER XX.

SINKING OF THE IRON-CLAD CINCINNATI—MINING OPERATIONS OF THE ENEMY—HARDSHIPS OF THE SIEGE.

Wednesday morning, the 27th of May, was ushered in with the same unceasing stream of shells and Minie balls pouring over the breastworks, our men looking on their advent as a matter of course. The firing from the mortars still continued, with little or no intermission, from the peninsula, while fragments of, and thirteen-inch shells could be seen scattered in every part of the town.

At about ten o'clock on this morning, several of the enemy's gunboats below the city advanced a short way up the river, and opened a rapid fire on our lower batteries, but without doing any particular damage. While this bombardment was going on, one of the enemy's boats, the iron-clad ram Cincinnati, steamed down from the fleet, behind the peninsula, and opened fire on our water battery above the city. As soon as she had got in range of our guns we opened fire. She replied with remarkable rapidity, pouring broadside after broadside of grape and canister at the battery. The men at the guns stood up to their posts gallantly, firing shot and shell at the Cincinnati as fast as possible. Their guns, however, being too small, had little or no effect upon the iron sides of the ram, all of them that struck her glancing off like an india rubber ball.

On the hill below the water battery was a battery containing one eight-inch Brooks gun, under the command, we think, of Captain Johnson, of the 1st Tennessee heavy artillery regiment. This gun was one of the finest pieces of ordnance in Vicksburg, and had obtained the *soubriquet* of "Whistling Dick," from the shrill whistle of its shells as they sped through the air. Soon after the Cincinnati had steamed down and opened fire on the water battery, "Whistling Dick" was brought to bear upon her, and the shrill whistle of its shells was soon heard. The engagement had lasted several minutes, the firing on both sides increasing in rapidity, and still the iron-clad continued to pour volley after volley into the water battery, upon the holding of which depended the safety of the extreme left of our line; at last a well-directed shot from "Whistling Dick" pierced her armor, and, as if fortune had changed in favor of our forces, several other shots in rapid succession went crashing through her iron plating. In a few moments she was disabled and in a sinking condition. She immediately backed up the river, being afraid to turn and expose her broadside to our guns, and ran aground on the Mississippi shore, in full range of our guns, but within the enemy's picket line. Our batteries continued firing on her until she was hopelessly disabled, when they ceased.

As soon as the *Cincinnati* was run aground, her officers and crew took to their boats and escaped, with the exception of a few, who fell into our hands. They reported that the attack by the *Cincinnati* had been made in accordance with the request of Major General Sherman, who had said that if she could silence the water battery, and shell our men from their works, there would be no difficulty in his entering the city, as the battery was the only obstacle in his path. This statement was no doubt correct, as Sherman's entire corps rested on their arms during the engagement, as if waiting for the battery to be silenced, for them to storm the works. No attempt was made, however, on the line, in consequence of the sinking of the *Cincinnati*.

After the destruction of this boat, the enemy's fleet made no demonstration of the like nature during the remainder of the siege. The enemy being satisfied, no doubt, of the inability of iron-clad boats to remain in one position and engage land batteries. This engagement proved the superiority of land batteries over war vessels, even when iron clad. Had the *Cincinnati* desired it, she could have run past the batteries, without being injured in the least, but all her modern improvements failed when she stood up squarely to give and receive a broadside. During the engagement between the iron-clad and our batteries, nothing transpired on the line, beyond the usual amount of artillery firing and sharpshooting.

After their repulse on the 22d of May, the enemy, finding that our position could not be taken by storm, commenced mining. The reason of the enemy's coming so close to our works as to be able to dig under them, was the want of foresight in Gen. Pemberton's order prohibiting the expenditure of ammunition. Not being permitted to use the artillery, or to return the fire of the sharpshooters, our men were compelled to see the enemy approach nearer every day, until they had worked their way to within thirty yards of our breastworks. That this could have been prevented, was the opinion of many prominent officers of the garrison, who favored our throwing out a body of picked men every day to act as sharpshooters, and prevent the enemy from making his approaches. If this could not have prevented them entirely from approaching, it could have, at least, prevented their mining our works.

The enemy, having been permitted to approach as near as above described, went vigorously to work, mining our line of entrenchments at various places, the principal point being on the left of the Jackson road, held by the third Louisiana, of Hebert's brigade. The means at our disposal for annoying them in their labor, were limited to throwing a few hand grenades at their working parties, but these had little or no effect, as the fuses attached to them being very often too long, the enemy would pick them up before they exploded, and throw them

back. The enemy, at first, worked only in the night, but pushed on their operations with untiring energy and determination. Had the sharpshooting been less severe, some effort would have been made to drive them out with musketry; but the Minie balls swept the line of entrenchments night and day, making it almost certain death for any of the men to show their bodies above the parapet of our works; at the same time, the greater portion of our artillery had been dismounted or disabled by the fire of the enemy. This was occasioned from the open condition of our works, the positions for the guns being all exposed, while the guns themselves were all *en barbette*, which rendered them easily dismounted by the fire of the enemy, and prevented our gunners from working them.

These circumstances, discouraging as they were, did not cause the least fear on the part of the men; and although they were well aware that as soon as the enemy completed their mines, the works would be blown up, their patriotic ardor remained unabated; the garrison was filled with enthusiasm for their cause, and expressed the same unflinching determination—as they had done before the works were mined—to maintain their position so long as they could fire a gun. In fact, the spirit of our men seemed to rise with the danger; their confidence in their ability to repulse the enemy, should he attack again, was still the same; all had but one desire: the successful defense of the city they had so long been fighting to hold.

It was about this period that the hardships and privations of a siege began to be comprehended and experienced. From the smallness of the garrison, and the extent of our line, it required every available man to occupy the works. The troops were thus compelled to remain behind the breastworks and in the rifle-pits for weeks without removing from their crouching positions, and subject to the different changes of weather. Very often a storm would rise, and the rain come pouring down, drenching them to the skin, and they would be unable to leave the works for the purpose of changing their clothing, but were compelled to remain in their damp and unhealthy garments, until the sun shone again and dried them. It is, therefore, no surprise that the list of sick in the garrison was large and daily increasing. Their food had to be cooked by details of men from each company, and brought to them at the breastworks, and they remained for weeks together without either washing their clothes or bathing themselves. Under this accumulation of hardships, they bore themselves manfully; and although it was apparent that the life they were then leading would soon break down their constitutions, and weaken them beyond the powers of endurance, not a murmur was heard, or a voice raised expressing discontent.

For a period of about five days after the siege commenced, the garrison was pretty comfortable, so far as food was con-

cerned, as they were allowed full rations. At the expiration of that time, however, Major General C. L. Stephenson, who had been appointed Chief of Subsistence, perceived that the supply of provisions on hand at that time would not last many days, if the soldiers continued to receive the allowance provided for them by the regulations. The rations were then gradually reduced, until it reached the following small amount of food, daily issued to each man as rations for twenty-four hours:

Flour, or meal.....	4	ounces.
Bacon.....	4	"
Rice.....	1½	"
Peas, (scarcely eatable).....	2	"
Sugar.....	3	"

the whole making a total of fourteen and a half ounces of food per day, or less than one-quarter the amount of rations usually issued to the men as full allowance. This small amount naturally brought the men to the verge of starvation, and was entirely inadequate to supply the cravings of nature. Though the men felt that such was the case, and saw that, under this partial starvation, their strength would soon fail, all cheerfully submitted to the inexorable necessity that had reduced them to such a strait.

CHAPTER XXI.

SORTIES ON THE ENEMY'S LINE—ERECTION OF "LOGAN FORT" BY THE ENEMY.

The days intervening from the twenty-seventh of May to the first of June, were devoid of any movement, on the part of the enemy, of interest. The cannonading and sharpshooting continued at times severely; while at other times it would slacken considerably. Several sorties were made by details from the different brigades in our army, which, in a measure, relieved the monotonous life our soldiers were leading. One of these sorties was a brilliant affair. It was made by Brigadier General Lee, and resulted in the capture of nearly two hundred of the enemy belonging to an Indiana regiment. The attack was made with great skill and caution, and took the enemy completely by surprise, as they never imagined we would venture on any such undertaking.

Shut up as the garrison was, and completely surrounded by the enemy, we were completely ignorant of everything transpiring outside of the city, except on the safe arrival of a courier in our lines. As these were of rare occurrence, we remained in

profound ignorance of the true state of affairs outside nearly all the time. As will be found in all places, rumors of every kind and any quantity were circulated among the garrison, tending for a while to elate them with the hope of a speedy relief, all of them however turned out false, much to the chagrin of the soldiers whom the reports had deceived.

In the night the pickets of both armies would abstain from firing, and would sit down and engage in conversation, each bragging of their ability to whip the other. Many of these interviews were very amusing, and the incidents that occurred were the source of much laughter to our men, who would show their wit at every opportunity, for the purpose of exasperating the enemy. At one time, so familiar had the pickets become, that they would meet one another on the neutral ground between the two armies and discuss the merits of the war. The defense on both sides would be carried on with considerable vehemence, until argument failed on one side or the other, when they would separate to avoid, as a Yankee told one of our men who had argued him beyond reply, any fighting over the subject! As soon as this familiarity was discovered, strict orders were given to prohibit its continuation, and in a measure it was stopped, nevertheless some "good joke" occurring between them would leak out now and then, but as the parties with whom it took place could never be discovered, the officers were obliged to laugh at the joke, and leave the disobedient party unpunished. In these conversations the different motives which occupied the opposing forces and impelled them to fight, would be apparent and form a striking contrast. The conversation of the Yankee would be principally directed to the fine country they had gone through, and its capacity for making money, while that of the Confederate soldier would be a defense of his country, and his determination never to go back into their accursed Union. We do not mention this from prejudice to the Yankee, or from what was reported to us by other parties, but from the strict character of Grant's army, and the sordid motives actuating them, and their conversation with us after the surrender.

On the first of June the enemy kept up a heavy fire, both in front and rear, from his mortars, Parrott's and other guns, and his sharpshooters poured thousands of Minie balls into our line. The enemy's sharpshooters were all splendid marksmen, and effectually prevented any of our men from rising above the parapet on pain of certain death, while it was an utter impossibility for our cannoners, to load the guns remaining in position on our line, without being exposed to the aim of a dense line of sharpshooters.

Our line of works, as planned by Major General M. L. Smith, was as good as could be desired, but the execution of his plans was the most miserable ever performed by men claiming to be engineers. There were several faults in the construction of

these works, the principal of which were: first, they were not high enough; second, they were not built sufficiently thick; and third, the bastions on which the guns rested were entirely too much exposed, and afforded no protection to the gunners.

There was a hill on the immediate left of the Jackson road, which ought to have been occupied by our forces, as it commanded that portion of our works afterwards held by the third Louisiana regiment. Brigadier General Louis Hebert, one of our ablest and most gallant officers, desired to hold this hill at the commencement of the siege, and before the enemy had invested us, but was prevented from so doing, we suppose, by order of his superior officers. This hill was afterwards occupied by the enemy, and a fort, known as "Logan Fort," erected on it. This position appears to have been entirely overlooked by our engineers, or its importance was very much undervalued.

So badly were the works erected, that three days after the siege commenced the enemy had enfiladed us, and a few days after that, opened a fire in reverse. We were thus subject to a continual fire from all quarters. The number of pieces of artillery brought to bear upon our defenses, could not have been less than from two hundred and fifty to three hundred of all descriptions and calibres. This large number of guns, keeping up a constant fire on our lines, naturally created an uproar almost deafening, and as a result, thousands of shells were poured into our works. There was no portion of the space of ground in our lines but where whole shells and fragments of shells could be seen, while at the line, and about one hundred yards from it, thousands upon thousands of Minie balls covered the road and woods. Enough of these little missiles could have been picked up in half an hour to have supplied our army for a day.

CHAPTER XXII.

SPIES IN THE CITY. CONDITION OF THE CITY. FIGHT BETWEEN THE ENEMY AND A TENNESSEE REGIMENT.

On Tuesday, the second of June, it was expected that the enemy would make a second general assault on our works, from certain suspicious movements of theirs the night previous. In accordance with this, preparations were immediately made to meet the threatened attack, and to give the enemy a warm reception on his assault. The day passed, however, without their attempting anything more than the customary bombardment, except on the peninsula, where the enemy appeared to slacken their fire somewhat, not caring to strain their mortars too much.

On the night of the first of June, several buildings in the city, on Washington street, were set on fire by incendiaries, and burnt down, while the parties who set them on fire were never discovered. That there were spies and emissaries of the enemy in the city is beyond a doubt true; as we were informed by a gentleman of reliability, that two or three days before the incendiarism narrated above took place, a man clad in the enemy's uniform, and to all appearance a stranger in Vicksburg, was observed walking about the city; several questions he propounded excited the suspicions of the party to whom he addressed them, and after answering them in an evasive manner, the party hastened to give information to the provost guard respecting the singular appearance of this man, and the suspicious questions he had asked. A guard was immediately started after him, and after awhile discovered him walking up one of the streets. As soon as he observed them approaching him with the party he had previously questioned, he must have defined what they were coming for, for he immediately started off at a run, pursued by the guard for some distance, until he arrived at some deserted buildings, which he entered. When the guard arrived they went into the building after him, but he could not be discovered. That he was a spy is evident, and we feel sure that he was well acquainted with the buildings he entered, otherwise he would have been captured.

The damage done to the city up to this date was small, when we consider the amount of shells that had been thrown into it. It is true that a great many buildings had been struck, but none demolished; all of those struck were still tenable, and were occupied by the different families during the brief moments that the enemy's mortars were silent. After the first excitement was over, the citizens became quite hopeful of the result, and from the exaggerated reports brought by couriers of the strength of Johnston's army, it was confidently believed that the day of relief would soon come, and that the siege would be shortly raised. Not the slightest fear was expressed of the city ever falling into the hands of the enemy; not a man, woman or child believed such an event at all likely to occur, but all anticipating the defeat and destruction of Grant's army as soon as Johnston arrived with the fifty thousand men he was reported to have under his command.

The same course of shelling and sharpshooting continued, without anything of importance being attempted by the enemy. They had now decided on a regular investment of the city, and determined upon making gradual approaches by means of their engineers and sappers and miners, until they could come up close to our works, when they would make another endeavor to storm our lines; if unsuccessful, they would then keep us penned up until starvation compelled the garrison to capitulate. That such was their idea we were repeatedly informed by their pickets.

Until the twenty-fifth of June, nothing of interest transpired, except at one or two points along our lines, and an occasional sortie by the garrison on the enemy's works. One night, a sharp skirmish took place beyond our picket lines, between a body of the enemy and a regiment of Tennesseans belonging to Reynolds' brigade. The regiment had gone out for the purpose of cutting wood for fuel and cane tops for the horses, they being compelled to subsist wholly on that, all the fodder being exhausted, and the corn ground into meal for the soldiers. As was customary, they carried their arms with them, so as to be prepared in case of emergency. While in the midst of their work, the Yankee pickets opened fire on them. As this act of the enemy was contrary to their usual habit, it so exasperated the men that, throwing down their axes, they seized their arms and drove in the pickets. The enemy, alarmed at this demonstration, quickly threw forward a large body of their infantry, who met the Tennesseans just as they were driving in the pickets. A brisk fight ensued, in which the Tennesseans behaved very gallantly, and succeeded in cutting off and capturing a large number of the enemy. On another occasion a sortie made by our forces resulted very successfully, our men capturing Lt. Col. Cann, of an Illinois regiment, and several of the enemy, besides spiking one of their guns.

Instead of encouraging these expeditions, Lieutenant General Pemberton appeared disposed to stop them. An expedition was organized one night for the purpose of storming the enemy's works on the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, and throwing the mortars and guns into the river, by that way saving the city considerable injury from the enemy's shells, and the inhabitants from annoyance. A letter was sent in to Lieutenant General Pemberton, requesting his permission for the party to cross the river on the first dark night, and make the attempt, but the General refused his consent, on the ground that it was too dangerous an experiment; besides which, he was certain it could not be successful. Had the permission been granted, we are pretty certain it would have resulted favorably to us, as the party who would have attempted it were picked men, of daring and courage, and men upon whom reliance could have been placed. After this reply, however, the idea was abandoned, and was not again thought of during the remainder of the siege.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CONDITION OF VICKSBURG. CONDUCT OF THE INHABITANTS. SPIRIT OF THE WOMEN.

By the middle of June, Vicksburg was in a deplorable condition. There was scarcely a building but what had been struck by the enemy's shells, while many of them were entirely demolished. The city had the appearance of a half-ruined pile of buildings, and on every street unmistakable signs of the fearful bombardment it had undergone, presented themselves to the observer.

Many families of wealth had eaten the last mouthful of food in their possession, and the poor class of non-combatants were on the verge of starvation. The situation of the latter was indeed terrible; for while the former class of population were able to buy what little food remained in the hands of the heartless speculators, at such prices as they—money-grasping and unpatriotic creatures—would demand, the poor people were without money, and consequently their sufferings were terrible.

It is true there was not much provision in the city; in fact there was scarcely any. At the same time, the prices charged for what was there, were such as to make a man wonder whether the sellers had the slightest touch of pity in them. Shut up, as they were in our lines, with a knowledge that at any moment one, of the hundreds of shells falling around them, might end their existence, their thirst for money remained unabated, and the holders of what food there was, actually asked and received the following prices: Flour, five dollars per pound, or nearly one thousand dollars per barrel; meal, one hundred and forty dollars per bushel; molasses, ten and twelve dollars per gallon; and beef, (very often oxen killed by the enemy's shells, and picked up by the butchers,) at two dollars and two dollars and a half per pound. As we are unacquainted with the names of these infamous parties, we are unable to publish them to world, to receive the scorn their conduct merits.

The military authorities assisted these poor unfortunates as much as they possibly could, and Lieutenant General Pemberton gave them the privilege to grind all the corn they could get at the government mills; but this assistance went but a small way to relieve their wants, and they would undoubtedly have perished but for the benevolent and generous conduct of the wealthier classes of citizens, who set to work for the purpose of averting the horrors which threatened them. Among those who aided with their time and means in this highly meritorious work, we take great pleasure in giving the names of W. H. Stevens, Rev. ——— Rutherford, of the Methodist Church; Victor F. Wilson, and a German by the name of J.

Kaiser. This last named gentleman acted nobly. He had several hundred bushels of corn at his residence, which he handed over to a committee appointed for the purpose, reserving for himself *just enough* to last his family during the siege. We make particular mention of his conduct, because it was an act of charity rarely met with in his nation, and the exception, on his part, deserves more than a passing notice. There were many other citizens of Vicksburg who acted liberally towards the half-starved poor of the city, but we have not been able to obtain their names.

We cannot frame words of sufficient eloquence to express our admiration for the noble manner in which the women in the city acted during the siege. Never, we believe, did the Carthaginian women evince more patriotism during the siege of Carthage, than did the spirited and noble-hearted women of Vicksburg. It is true that they were not called upon to make as many sacrifices as the women of Carthage were, a fact which only arose from the different ages in which they lived. Among the poorer classes of women; the feeling of patriotism was strong, and the desire for a successful defense was apparent in their conversation, while the feeling among the wealthier class of women almost amounted to a wild enthusiasm. Never, during this war, have their devotion to, and interest in, the cause been so severely tested, and never has the bright light of patriotism shone in mankind with as much brilliancy as it did in the hearts of the women of Vicksburg, during the forty-seven days the siege lasted. Amid the stream of mortar and Parrott shells that came pouring on the devoted city, bursting around them, and creating an uproar, as if all the demons of hell had broken loose, and were ascending to earth, these heroic women remained unawed. On the 22d of May, when the enemy endeavored to storm our works, the anxiety, on their part, that we should succeed in repulsing them, and the joy they evinced at learning we had gained the day, were of the most striking nature, while, on the day of the engagement with the *Cincinnati*, a large number of them congregated on the most prominent points in the city to witness the fight, regardless of the shells bursting above them, and the fragments falling around.

As might be expected, several of the women and children were killed or wounded during the siege; among those who were unfortunately struck by the balls and shells, we only recollect the following as killed: Miss Holly, Mrs. Cescie, and a Miss Jones. Among those who were wounded are a Mrs. Hazzard, Mrs. C. W. Peters, Mrs. W. H. Clements, Mrs. Major T. B. Read, Miss Lucy Rawlings, Miss Margaret Cook, and a Miss Hassley. These are only a portion of those who got injured, the remaining names we were unable to procure.

Notwithstanding the heavy list of casualties among the women and children, their spirit remained unbroken, and the same

desire was expressed among them, that the city should be successfully defended. Even those who were wounded, half forgot their pains in the height of their patriotism, and suffering as they were from their wounds, their unanimous desire was, that the city should be held until relief should come, even if they had to die for it. The conduct of these heroic women should be remembered long after the independence of the South is achieved, and though their names will never be known, the future historian of our struggle for freedom, should delight to honor and praise the exalted heroism and patriotic virtues of these women, many of whom, delicately nurtured, and reared amid all the luxuries that wealth could afford, preferred to suffer the pangs of hunger and live in damp caves, or endure the pains of wounds inflicted by the missiles of the enemy, which even strong men have groaned under, rather than see the home of their nativity surrendered to the enemy of their country; and we believe that, had it been necessary, they would have been found at our entrenchments ready to aid, as much as their feeble powers could afford, in the defense of Vicksburg. Though the pen of the writer of this work, cannot indite words sufficient to portray the nobleness they exhibited during the memorable siege of forty-seven days duration, in future days he trusts that some one, more gifted than himself, will show to the world, as examples of feminine patriotism and endurance, the **HEROINES OF VICKSBURG.**

CHAPTER XXIV.

EXPLOSION OF ONE OF THE ENEMY'S MINES—PARTIAL DESTRUCTION OF A PORTION OF OUR WORKS—SEVERE ENGAGEMENT AND REPULSE OF THE FOE.

On discovering that the enemy were engaged in mining our works, and seeing our inability to prevent the prosecution of their work, measures were immediately taken to countermine and blow up the working parties of the enemy. These attempts however were not successful, as the inadequate means at our command, and the position of the hills on which our works were erected, rendered any undertaking of this nature very difficult. On one portion of the line occupied by Major General M. L. Smith, the countermining was partially successful, several of the enemy having been killed when it was blown up; even this, we cannot vouch for, not having been present at the explosion, although the information was received from a very good source.

The enemy, by means of their sappers and miners, had gradually approached, until they had erected powerful works within thirty yards of some portions of our line. On the left of the Jackson road, they had occupied the hill, mentioned in a previous chapter, and erected a large fort on it. This hill was on the immediate left of the road, about thirty yards distant from the line of fortifications occupied by the third Louisiana, of Hebert's brigade. As we stated before, it was a very high and strategic position, entirely overlooking our works, and which Brig. General Hebert desired to hold, on the Monday his troops were placed in position, being apprehensive of the enemy taking possession of it, which would have enabled them to have kept up a destructive fire on the third Louisiana, and also enfilade the road held by the consolidated twenty-first and twenty-third Louisiana regiments. His desire not being granted, the hill was left to the enemy, who quickly perceived the advantageous position they had gained, and put it to good use accordingly.

From this point the enemy kept up a constant and concentrated fire on the works, and from the vigor with which he bombarded them; it became apparent that this position would be the principal point of attack. It was at first thought that the concentration of their fire on this particular point, was an endeavor to destroy the works, but it was afterwards discovered as only intended to cover their mining operations, under the fort comprising a portion of our defenses on the left of the road, which from the advantages possessed by the enemy, progressed rapidly, and was soon in a state of completion.

As soon as this was discovered, General Hebert, who had shown considerable skill and valor during the siege, set to work and endeavored to foil them in their efforts. He first had a number of hand grenades manufactured, which he directed to be thrown at the enemy's working parties, and in a measure stopped the prosecution of their work for a time, but this even failed, as the enemy worked perseveringly in the night, and succeeded in making an excavation under the fort of sufficient size to protect them from the hand grenades, while our men were unable to throw them in the hollow formed, in consequence of the slanting construction of the parapet.

Having failed in his endeavor to prevent the enemy from mining the fort, General Hebert immediately set to work, and had a new line, of some length, built in the rear of the threatened point. The work under his superintendence was pushed forward with as much alacrity as the number of laborers he could command could push it forward.

The work having been at last completed, by the twenty-fifth of June the majority of the third Louisiana were removed from the mined fort and positioned in the new line, which was very close to its rear. Previous to this, the enemy must have completed their mine, and made preparations to blow up the fort,

for between four and five o'clock on the evening of this same day, their train was fired, and a terrific explosion took place. Huge masses of earth were thrown up in the air, and those who experienced it, state that the ground was shook as if from an earthquake or a volcanic eruption. As soon as the earth was rent, a bright glare of fire issued from the burning powder, but quickly died away, as there was nothing of a combustible nature in the fort to ignite. In consequence of the men having been previously removed from the work, but few of them were injured, but all of them were considerably jarred by the shock.

Perceiving the fort partially destroyed, a column of the enemy's infantry, which had laid concealed in the hollow beneath the fort all day for the purpose, rushed forward with loud cheers for the purpose of gaining possession of the ruins. They were gallantly met, and a desperate struggle ensued. The third Louisiana, which is without doubt one of the best fighting regiments in the service, stood up manfully against overwhelming numbers, and despite every exertion on their part to storm the line, held them in check, until the sixth Missouri, another gallant regiment, under Col. Eugene Erwin, had arrived and reinforced them. As soon as they arrived, Col. Erwin, who was ahead of his men, immediately ascended the parapet of the ruined fort, when a Minie ball, from one of the sharpshooters, pierced his heart and he fell dead. He was a grandson of Henry Clay, and from the commencement of the war an ardent supporter of the South.

The Missourians, enraged at the death of their Colonel, fought like demons, and, aided by the third Louisiana, sprang into the ruined fort, and after a severe contest of two or three hours duration, succeeded in repulsing the enemy with great slaughter.

From our men being very much exposed to the enemy in this engagement, our loss was not less than eighty-six in killed and wounded; a very heavy list of casualties, for the small number of men engaged on our side. So close were the enemy to our men during the fight, that they could have conversed in a low tone with one another. Brigadier General Hebert was himself present during this engagement, and acted with his usual coolness and intrepidity.

The loss of the enemy could not have been less than four hundred in killed and wounded, as they lay in large numbers before our works after the fight, and a large number of wounded men were taken from the field as they fell. So severely punished were they in this attack, that in the second attempt they made to blow up the remainder of this fort, they did not try to storm the line.

While this struggle was going on, no demonstrations were made on any other portion of the line, beyond the accustomed amount of shelling and sharpshooting. Rumors of a speedy relief to the garrison were still spread among the troops, but from all the past reports proving false, the soldiers had begun to

doubt everything they heard, leaving it for time to decide whether they should be relieved or not.

CHAPTER XXV.

DEATH OF GEN. GREEN, OF MISSOURI. RUMORS OF GEN. JOHNSTON'S ADVANCE.

Two or three days after the destruction of our works by the explosion of the enemy's mine, an event of a most melancholy nature transpired. Brigadier General Green, commanding a brigade of Missourians and Arkansians, in Bowen's division, was shot in the neck by a Minie ball, while in conversation with his staff. Although medical aid was promptly given to him, it was of no avail; his wound was mortal, and after lingering for about an hour he expired.

Gen. Green was an aged man, esteemed by all who knew him for his unswerving devotion to the great cause for which he fell fighting, his intrepid valor, and his genial and amiable qualities. He was a quiet and unassuming man; all the unnecessary pomp and dignity of the high position he occupied were laid aside, and the meanest private in his command had free and uninterrupted access to his presence. So endeared was he to his men, that they looked upon him more in the light of a friend than that of a General. Many noble sons of Missouri have fallen in this struggle for independence, bravely fighting for their homes and firesides, now in possession of the foe, but none of her martyrs in this holy cause will be deserving of greater praise, or spoken of in more glowing terms, than the aged and patriotic Brigadier General Green. We were told that he wished, previous to his death, that he would not live to see the city surrendered. If such was his wish, he was gratified, for the fatal ball, that ended his career on earth, came just four days before the offer was made to yield Vicksburg to the enemy.

No event of any importance transpired from this day to the twenty-ninth of June. The army and the citizens had almost despaired of ever seeing Johnston arrive. The couriers who ran the gauntlet through the enemy's lines, and arrived safely in Vicksburg, brought the most exaggerated reports possible of the strength and position of the army soon to march to our relief. They stated that Gen. Johnston's force was not less than from fifty to sixty thousand strong, and were stretched from Jackson to Canton, Mississippi. With these reports, the people and garrison in general were surprised at his not making an advance on the enemy, as they felt certain that his force was as

strong as represented, there would be no difficulty in defeating any army the enemy could possibly send against him.

At this period, some unprincipled persons, actuated no doubt by animosity against General Johnston, spread a report in our lines, that it was not his intention to relieve the garrison, as he had given Lieutenant General Pemberton orders to evacuate the city, which order not being obeyed, if he (Johnston) came to the relief of the beleaguered army and succeeded in raising the siege, it would compromise his reputation as a commander and an officer. Such being the case, the garrison would not be relieved, and Vicksburg would be left to her fate.

These reports, coming to the ears of the soldiers, caused some feeling of anger against General Johnson for a short time. All doubts of his desire or intention to aid them were soon laid aside, however, by the reports given to the men by the enemy's pickets, and they determined to patiently await his arrival, being certain that as soon as he had organized a sufficiently large force, he would march to Vicksburg and raise the siege.

Among the many false reports brought into our line, was one which stated that Major General Loring had crossed the Big Black at Hankerson's Ferry, and was advancing towards Vicksburg, when he was met by an overwhelming force of the enemy. A severe engagement was then said to have ensued, in which General Loring was repulsed and compelled to fall back. After retreating for some distance, he was reinforced by Major General Breckinridge's division, and, making a stand the next day, fought a severe battle, routing the enemy and inflicting great slaughter on him, and capturing six thousand prisoners.

We make mention of these reports to show the deceptions practised on the men, although the statement narrated above was given by the enemy, so far as it relates to the repulse of Loring, but they said nothing about the subsequent defeat of their army. As may be supposed, these reports, cheering the men as they did, when contradicted, did not tend to lighten the sufferings of the men, or relieve the anxiety which all felt for the advent of succor.

The brave men, nevertheless, still continued to bear up cheerfully against the hardships and sufferings they were then enduring, and there were but few who expressed any fear of our ability to hold the city, or who grew doubtful of final success.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SECOND EXPLOSION OF THE ENEMY'S MINE, AND OCCUPATION OF A PORTION OF THE FORT—THE GARRISON REDUCED TO MULE MEAT.

After the explosion of their mine, on the 25th of June, and the partial destruction of the fort, the enemy set vigorously to work on a new mine, for the purpose of completing its destruction; and, having gotten everything in readiness, on the 29th of June, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, a second explosion took place, from which the enemy succeeded in destroying the remnant left standing. No effort was made to storm the works in the rear of the ruins, although several of our men were killed and wounded, either by the fragments of dirt, or by the explosion.

The third Louisiana regiment, which occupied this line throughout the siege, suffered more than any other body of men in the garrison. Several times their position was charged in the most desperate manner, and twice was it blown up by the enemy. The loss they sustained during the siege, was not far from two hundred out of about four hundred and fifty contained in the regiment when the siege commenced. This was a fearful loss, when we consider it with that of the other commands.

In spite of the exposed position they occupied, these men, heroes of Belmont, Oak Hill, Elk Horn and Corinth, stood up manfully to their posts, and held their position against every effort of the enemy to force their line. We make particular mention of this regiment without disparagement to any other of the commands, as all fought with a valor unsurpassed in the annals of war, but merely as an act of justice to a gallant body of men, the survivors of what was once a regiment nearly twelve hundred strong; and in giving them this praise, we but echo the opinion of every soldier in the Confederate army, who has seen them in battle.

The firing from the peninsula, with mortars and siege guns on Vicksburg, had meanwhile continued with violence. Additional guns were brought to bear upon the devoted city, making it almost untenable. Starvation, in its worst forms, now confronted the unfortunate inhabitants, and, had the siege lasted two weeks longer, the consequences would have been terrible. All the beef in the city was exhausted by this time, and mules were soon brought in requisition, and their meat sold readily at one dollar per pound, the citizens being as anxious to get it, as they were before the investment, to purchase the delicacies of the season. It was also distributed among the soldiers, to those who desired it, although it was not given out under the name of rations. A great many of them, however, accepted it in

preference to doing without any meat, and the flesh of the mules was found equal to the best venison. The author of this work partook of mule meat for three or four days, and found the flesh tender and nutritious, and, under the *peculiar circumstances*, a most desirable description of food.

CHAPTER XXVII.

SHELLING OF OUR HOSPITALS—CASUALTIES AMONG OUR OFFICERS.

During the siege, the enemy, forgetful of, or disregarding all rules of civilized warfare, exhibited a refinement of cruelty in firing at our hospitals. There were between four and five thousand sick and wounded soldiers in the different hospitals in Vicksburg, over each of which the usual yellow flag floated to designate that they were hospitals. Without appearing to care whether they were or not, the enemy deliberately fired into them, killing and wounding several of the unfortunate beings, whose ill-luck it was to be quartered there for medical treatment. That this barbarous act was committed intendedly, was apparent when the Washington Hotel, which had been converted into one of the hospitals, in full view of the enemy, on the banks of the river, was struck by a twelve-inch mortar. Humanity would scarcely feel inclined to believe that an act so fiendish could be perpetrated by men calling themselves civilized beings, but such was the case, and this conduct must forever remain a reproach upon the nation or people who could sanction such brutal behavior.

We have not been able to learn whether Lieutenant General Pemberton ever protested against the shelling of our hospitals, or remonstrated with General Grant at permitting it; if he did, no regard was paid to his complaint, as they continued their barbarity until the end of the siege. After the surrender of the city, the Federal officers, in explanation, and as an apology for their conduct, stated that the guns on the peninsula were manned by raw troops, and served the double purpose of annoying the city and practising the men, but that General Grant never countenanced, or gave his consent to the hospitals being shelled.

From the commencement of the siege to the time we write of, many noble and gallant officers had yielded their life in defense of their country. Among those killed were Colonel Herrick, of the 21st Louisiana; Lieutenant Colonel Rogers, of the 17th Louisiana; Major Hoadley, of the heavy Artillery; Colonel

Garrett, of the 20th Alabama; Major Martin, of the 26th Louisiana; Brigadier General Green, of Missouri; Colonel Eugene Erwin, of the 6th Missouri, and others. Among the wounded were Colonel W. Hall, of the 26th Louisiana; Colonel Patton, of the 28d Louisiana; Colonel Marks, of the 27th Louisiana, (since dead); and Brigadier General Baldwin, of Smith's division. There were, unfortunately, many others killed and wounded during the siege, who belonged to the field and staff, but their names, with those of the many hundreds of gallant spirits who fell in defense of the "Gibraltar of the South," could not be obtained; but though the world may never know their names, the silent voice of Freedom, more eloquent than all the praise we can bestow, will bless the memory of those who fell bravely fighting in a just cause, and a grateful nation will long mourn her unknown defenders who fell at their post of duty with their face to their foe, fighting heroically.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

SEALING OF THE FATE OF VICKSBURG—OFFER TO SURRENDER—INDIGNATION OF THE GARRISON.

No attempt was made to storm our works, or no demonstration made by the enemy, with their mines, from the twenty-ninth of June to the surrender of the city, although the same heavy cannonading and sharpshooting was kept up, until an armistice was requested by Lieutenant General Pemberton.

Several nights prior to the surrender of the city, the enemy's pickets told our men that preparations were being made to storm our works on the fourth of July, as Grant had determined to sup in Vicksburg on that night, or sup in h—I, to which remark one of our pickets replied, that as there was no chance of Grant's supping in Vicksburg on the fourth of July, it was very likely he would sup in the latter place. Not a man had the least idea that the city would be yielded up to the enemy on that day, all of them thinking that when the worse came we would cut our way out of the city. To cut our way out, however, was utterly impracticable. Our men were so weak and exhausted from the want of a sufficiency of food, that such an attempt would have resulted in the annihilation of the entire army, as we do not believe that out of the eighteen thousand men reported for duty, three thousand could have succeeded in reaching Big Black safely. This was evidently the opinion of Lieutenant General Pemberton and his subordinate Generals, and the surrender of the city was made. That surrendering was

the best course to be adopted we will acknowledge, but that we should have surrendered *then* is what we do not believe, if the statements made in defense of General Pemberton be true.— We will, however, refer to this in another chapter.

On Friday, the third of July, at about ten o'clock in the morning, a flag of truce was hoisted on the Jackson road and hostilities ceased. A short time afterwards General Bowen and Col. Montgomery, aid to General Pemberton, were seen leaving the works for the enemy's lines. As soon as they left the men conjectured that the object of their visit was to treat for a surrender of the city. The excitement among the men soon became alarming, until it was allayed by a statement that General Pemberton had sent to General Grant for the purpose of getting his consent to our removing the sick and wounded and the women and children from the city.

After remaining in the enemy's line for some time, General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery returned, when the official correspondence in the next chapter took place.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENs. PEMBERTON AND GRANT. SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG MADE.

This chapter contains the official correspondence of Generals Pemberton and Grant, which we copy from the United States papers. We give it so as to complete as much as possible this work

General Pemberton's Letter proposing the Surrender of Vicksburg.

HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT, Commanding United States forces.

General: I have the honor to present to you an armistice for — hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.

This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by Major General James Bowen.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. PEMBERTON.

To this General Grant replied as follows :

General Grant's Reply.

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, near Vicksburg, July 3, 1863.

Lieut. Gen. J. C. PEMBERTON, commanding Confederate forces,
etc.

General: Your note of this date, just received, proposes an armistice of several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation, through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The effusion of blood you propose stopping by this source can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due them as prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no other terms than those indicated above.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Major General.

Gen. Bowen, the bearer of Gen. Pemberton's letter, was received by Gen. A. J. Smith. He expressed a strong desire to converse with Gen. Grant, and accordingly, while declining this, Gen. Grant requested Gen. Smith to say, that if Gen. Pemberton desired to see him, an interview would be granted between the lines, in McPherson's front, at any hour in the afternoon which Gen. Pemberton might appoint.

A message was sent back to Gen. Smith appointing three o'clock as the hour. General Grant was there with his staff, and Gens. Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith. Gen. Pemberton came late, attended by Gen. Bowen and Col. Montgomery. He was much excited and impertinent in his answers to General Grant. The conversation was held apart, between Gen. Pemberton and his officers, and Gens. Grant, McPherson and A. J. Smith. The rebels insisted on being paroled, and allowed to march beyond our lines; officers and men all with eight days' rations, drawn from their own stores, the officers to retain their private property and body servants.

Gen. Grant heard what they had to say, and left them at the end of an hour and a half, saying he would send in his ultimatum in writing, to which Gen. Pemberton promised to reply before night, hostilities to cease in the meantime.

Gen. Grant then conferred at his headquarters with his corps and division commanders, and sent the following letter to Gen. Pemberton by the hand of General Logan and Lieutenant Colonel Wilson :

General Grant's offer for the Surrender.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, }
Near Vicksburg, July 3, 1863. }

Lieut. Gen. J. C. PEMBERTON, Commanding Confederate forces,
Vicksburg, Miss.

General: In conformity with the agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division, as a guard, and take possession at eight o'clock to-morrow morning. As soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, and staff, field and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property.

If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them; thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one. You will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and privates, as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles of these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present, authorized to sign the roll of prisoners. I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major General.

The officers who received this letter stated that it would be impossible to answer it by night, and it was not till a little before peep-of-day that the proposed reply was furnished.

Reply of Gen. Pemberton, accepting all the terms offered by General Grant.

HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG, July 3.

Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT, Commanding United States Forces.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms for the surrender of this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted; but in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have the honor to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us: At ten o'clock to-morrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command by marching out with my colors and arms and stacking them in front of my present limits, after which you will take possession;

officers to retain their side arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected.

I am, General, yours, very respectfully,

J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General.

To this General Grant immediately replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, }
Before Vicksburg, July 4, 1863. }

Lieutenant General PEMBERTON, commanding forces in Vicksburg:

General: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of the 3d of July. The amendments proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by myself, which, with the completion of the rolls of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again: I can make no stipulation with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause any of them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under restraint by stipulations. The property which officers can be allowed to take with them, will be as stated in the proposition of last evening—that is, that officers will be allowed their private baggage and side arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your propositions for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack their arms at ten o'clock, A. M., and then return to the inside and remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objections to it. Should no modification be made of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock, A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags will be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing on your men.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Major General United States Army.

To this the subjoined answer has this moment been received:
*Unconditional Acceptance by General Pemberton of the terms
Proposed by General Grant.*

HEADQUARTERS, Vicksburg, }
July 4, 1863. }

Major General U. S. GRANT, commanding United States forces,
etc.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and in reply, to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted. Very respectfully,

J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General.

CHAPTER XXX.

SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG AND GARRISON—TERMS OF
CAPITULATION—LAYING DOWN OF THE ARMS.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon of the third of July, Lieutenant General Pemberton, accompanied by Major General Bowen, left our lines and proceeded to the neutral ground, previously designated, and had an interview with General Grant. The result of their conference we have already given in the copied correspondence. After an absence of about two hours' duration, Lieutenant General Pemberton and Major General Bowen returned into our lines. As an armistice had been declared until ten o'clock that evening, the firing ceased, and the shades of night descended upon the two opposing armies in quietude, unbroken, save by the voices of the soldiers in low but angry and indignant conversation, at what they deemed a disgrace upon their country in surrendering the city they had so long and nobly fought, and endured the pangs of hunger to defend.

At dark, on the evening of this day, a council of all the Generals was held at General Pemberton's headquarters, which lasted for several hours. Although we could not learn what transpired in an official way, we received information, from good authority, that it was decided, by a majority of the general officers, that the troops were entirely too weak from the want of food to cut their way through, and that if the position had to be yielded, it was useless to sacrifice the lives of the men in a fruitless endeavor; so that the only course left was to surrender the garrison on General Grant's terms of capitulation. Of the Major Generals present, we understand that Major General M. L. Smith was the only one who absolutely opposed surrendering on any condition, preferring to remain behind the breastworks and starve rather than give up the city. A majority of the council, being of a contrary opinion to him, however, he was, of course, necessitated to abide by their decision, and about three o'clock a messenger was sent into General Grant's lines with dispatches from Lieutenant General Pemberton.

On Saturday morning, a circular was issued from headquarters, announcing the surrender of Vicksburg and garrison, and stating the terms of capitulation to be as follows:

1st. The entire garrison of Confederate troops was to be surrendered to Major General Grant, commanding the United States forces.

2d. The prisoners of war were to be paroled and sent out of the city as soon as blank paroles were printed.

3d. All mounted officers to have the privilege of retaining their horses.

4th. All officers of every grade and rank were to retain their side arms, &c.

5th. All citizens desiring to leave the city with the Confederate forces, could do so on being paroled.

6th. All ammunition, stores, field artillery and siege guns, were to be surrendered to the United States forces, as also all small arms in our possession.

These are about the substance of the terms of capitulation. Although we made no copy of Lieutenant General Pemberton's circular, this will be found as correct a statement as could be desired.

When it was officially announced to our men that Vicksburg was surrendered to the enemy, their indignation knew no bounds. Having been among the troops, we can truthfully speak what we heard and saw of the expressions of sentiment on their part relative to the surrender. With almost an unanimous voice the soldiers declared that General Pemberton had yielded the city without their will, and against any desire on their part. All expressed a determination never to serve under him again, many stating, that rather than be under the command of such a man, they would desert from the army, if they were afterwards shot for it. It is not to be denied that the feeling among the men amounted almost to a mutinous one—to such a degree, indeed, was it, that many threats were made, which only the argument and supplication of the officers prevented the men from putting into execution.

All the statements we have made above in reference to the feelings of the soldiers are truth—every word truth, and in substantiation of them, we call upon the soldiers and officers composing the garrison of Vicksburg, to vouch for all we have said.

On Saturday morning, the fourth of July, and the anniversary of American Independence, the troops composing the army of Lieutenant General Pemberton marched from the line of intrenchments they had defended and held for nearly two months, amid hardships and privations unsurpassed in the annals of modern warfare, and after stacking the arms they had so well and nobly used, and lowering the standards which had proudly floated on many a bloody battle-field, returned inside the works, prisoners of war to their bitterest foe.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OCCUPATION OF VICKSBURG BY THE ENEMY. CONDUCT OF YANKEE SOLDIERS. IMPUDENCE OF NEGROES.

On Saturday, at twelve o'clock, M., Logan's division of McPherson's corps, of the Federal army, commenced entering the city, and in a quarter of an hour Vicksburg was crammed with them. Their first act was to take possession of the court house, on the spire of which they hoisted the United States flag, amid the exultant shouts of their comrades, and a deep feeling of humiliation on the part of the Confederate soldiers who witnessed the hauling up of the flag which they had hoped never to see floating over the city they had so long and proudly boasted impregnable, and never to be taken by the enemy of the South.

After the enemy's forces had stacked their arms, they scattered over the city, and then commenced a scene of pillage and destruction which beggars all description. Houses and stores were broken open, and their contents appropriated by the plunderers. The amount of money and property stolen in this way was enormous, and the Yankee soldiers appeared to glory in their vandalism. One merchant, by the name of G. C. Kress, had his safe broken open, and twenty thousand dollars in money, with a large supply of clothing, taken away. Another merchant, and well-known citizen of Mississippi, by the name of W. H. Stephens, had his store broken open and nearly all the contents taken away. In fact, every place that they could possibly enter without fear of resistance, was broken open and robbed of what was contained in them. The enemy appeared to glory in their course, and on one occasion, in reply to a remonstrance on the part of a gentleman whose residence they had broken open, they said, "we have fought hard enough to capture Vicksburg, and now we have got it, we intend to plunder every house in the d—d rebel city."

As soon as Gen. Grant heard of the wholesale pillage of the city that his followers had commenced, he ordered guards to be stationed over the town, and issued an order prohibiting any of his men from entering any other residence than that in which they were quartered, and threatening to punish any soldier who might be caught in the act of robbing citizens; at the same time he gave no satisfaction whatever, to those parties who had already suffered at the hands of his army. Several applications were made to him for redress, but he told the applicants he was unable to assist them, or give any permission to have the camps of the men searched; although, if any of his soldiers were discovered with stolen property in their possession, he would have it returned to their owners, on their proving it belonged to them. This was, of course, but poor consolation to the losers,

who were necessitated to be satisfied with this answer, and submit to their loss.

With that enterprise and greed for gain which characterizes the universal Yankee nation, on the same day that the Federal army entered Vicksburg, several places of business were opened, and signs informing the public that metallic coffins were on hand to remove the dead bodies of friends, and that express offices, book and fruit stores were "within," were to be seen upon several establishments on Washington street.

Soon after the enemy entered the city, Mr. William Lum, a well-known citizen of Vicksburg, took the oath of allegiance, and General Grant made his headquarters at the residence of this gentleman. The Jewish portion of the population, composed principally of Germans, with but one honorable exception, went forward and received the oath of allegiance to the United States. The one honorable exception sacrificed a store of goods, which cost him between thirty-five and forty thousand dollars, rather than remain under the control of the enemy.

The conduct of the negroes, after the entrance of their "liberators," was beyond all expression. While the Yankee army was marching through the streets, crowds of them congregated on the sidewalks, with a broad grin of satisfaction on their ebony countenances. The next day, which was Sunday, witnessed a sight, which would have been ludicrous had it not galled our soldiers by the reflection that they were compelled to submit to it. There was a great turn out of the "contrabands," dressed up in the most extravagant style imaginable, and promenading through the streets, as if Vicksburg had been confiscated and turned over them. In familiar conversation with the negro wenches, the soldiers of the Federal army were seen, arm-in-arm, marching through the streets, while the "bucks" congregated on the corners and discussed the happy event that had brought them freedom.

So arrogant did the negroes become after the entrance of the Federal forces, that no white Confederate citizen or soldier dared to speak to them, for fear of being called a rebel, or some other abusive epithet. One of the Confederate soldiers, happening to enter the garden of the house that the author of this work resided in, for the purpose of picking a peach, a negro, belonging to a gentleman of Vicksburg, who had charge of the garden, brought out a gun, and, taking deliberate aim at the soldier, was about to fire. We immediately threw up the gun, and, drawing a knife, threatened the negro if he fired at the man; no sooner was the threat made, than the negro, with an oath, levelled the gun at us and drew the trigger; luckily the cap snapped without exploding, and we succeeded in getting the gun away and discharging it.

While making these observations about the negroes, we would say that it was confined to the city negroes alone. The slaves

brought in by planters, and servants of soldiers and officers, did not appear the least gratified at their freedom. The majority of those connected with our army were very desirous of leaving with their masters, and General Grant at first consented that those who desired it should leave; but as soon as a few passes were made out, he revoked the order, and compelled the balance to remain. These differences in the conduct of city and country negroes, should not be a matter of surprise, when we consider the privileges given to the negroes in the cities of the South, and demands a change of policy on the part of slave-owners residing in densely populated places. Many of the negroes, who were compelled to remain in Vicksburg when their masters in the army left, afterwards made their escape, and returned to the Confederate lines.

CHAPTER XXXII.

LOSS DURING THE SIEGE. NUMBER OF CONFEDERATES CAPTURED. ARMS AND AMMUNITION SURRENDERED. OPINIONS OF THE ENEMY.

The loss of the Confederate forces during the siege, is estimated by good judges at a number not exceeding 4,000 in killed and wounded. A number of our casualties resulted from the indiscretion of the soldiers in exposing themselves to the enemy's sharpshooters. The loss of the enemy we would estimate as follows:

Attack on Shoup's line, 19th of May,	600	killed and wounded.
General assault on the 22d May.....	9,000	" "
Attack on Hebert's line, 25th June..	600	" "
Prisoners captured.....	500	
Other casualties during the siege....	2,000	

Making a total of.....12,700

This estimate we believe to be much beneath what it really was, as in our opinion the enemy lost nearly as much as the total, on the twenty-second of May, for, taking the ratio of six men wounded for one killed, we find that as many as two thousand dead bodies were buried by the enemy on the Monday following. This would make their loss on that day alone 14,000, or more than the grand total we give above. The assertion of Grant, in his official report, that he lost only 8,000 men during the campaign, is a glaring falsehood, as we feel certain that on the day mentioned above he lost more than he states his casu-

alties to be from the landing at Bruinsburg to the surrender of the city.

The total amount of prisoners captured at Vicksburg by the enemy did not exceed twenty-four thousand, of which, nearly six thousand were either sick or wounded. The following general officers were captured: Lieutenant General Pemberton; Major Generals M. L. Smith, J. H. Forney, J. Bowen, and C. L. Stephenson. The names of the Brigadier Generals captured were: Hebert, Moore, Barton, Lee, Buford, Shoup, Baldwin, Vaughn and Taylor; the latter being Inspector General of the army.

Our loss in small arms and artillery was about as follows:

Small Arms.....	35,000
Siege Guns.....	27
Field Artillery.....	70

A great many pieces of the artillery were unfit for use, and could have been of no use to the enemy.

The amount of ammunition delivered over to the Yankee officers was large, and as near as we could find out, was as follows:

Musket Cartridges.....	600,000 rounds.
Field Artillery Cartridges.....	15,000 "
Heavy Artillery Cartridges.....	15,000 "
Percussion Caps.....	350,000

This estimate we believe very moderate, as it only gives for each man thirty-five rounds of musket cartridges, and about twenty percussion caps each. We are quite certain that a considerably larger amount of ammunition was surrendered to the enemy. This estimate, however, is made to avoid all charges of exaggeration.

Our line of works was pronounced by the enemy's engineer officers to be the most contemptible they had seen erected during the war. All expressed great astonishment that, with fifteen months of time before us, we had not converted Vicksburg into an impregnable fortress. They expressed themselves very much deceived in the strength of our works, as the representations of the Northern press, and our own boasting, had made them believe that Vicksburg was defended by well made works, and had between two and three hundred guns mounted.

Our works were, indeed, the most outrageous ever made during the war. The supervisors of their construction could have known no more about erecting fortifications than we do; in fact, there was not one engineer in the army of Vicksburg who understood his profession thoroughly—they existed but in name, and the position they held in the Confederate service. The ground on which the works were erected was naturally a strong one, and to that advantage alone were we enabled to hold the city for so long a time, otherwise they would have

offered but little or no impediment to the overwhelming numbers of the enemy which were thrown on the line in their attack on the twenty-second of May.

After the enemy had taken possession of Vicksburg, Major General McPherson rode over the entire length of the line, and was so impressed with the defective manner in which they were constructed, that he is reported to have exclaimed: "Good Heavens! are these the long-boasted fortifications of Vicksburg? It was the rebels, and not their works, that kept us out of the city." While this was a great compliment to the valor of the "rebels," it certainly expressed the greatest contempt possible for the fortifications surrounding Vicksburg.

The Federal officers candidly gave the Confederate garrison the credit of being as brave troops as they ever saw, and more than one compliment to the heroism of our soldiers was paid, coupled with a regret on the part of the officers of rank, that such men should be in arms against the United States. Not a word was said by the Yankees claiming superiority in fighting qualities; they all acknowledged that starvation had conquered us, and not the prowess of their arms, and during the stay of the garrison in Vicksburg, the greatest courtesy and consideration was shown to our soldiers by the Federal officers; their privates alone manifesting any desire to gloat over our reverse.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

A WEEK IN THE ENEMY'S LINES. PAROLING THE GARRISON. DEPARTURE FROM VICKSBURG.

The Confederate army remained in Vicksburg, as prisoners of war, for one week after the surrender, that time being taken to prepare the rolls of the different commands, and parole the men. During this period many severe street fights took place between the Federal and Confederate soldiers, in consequence of the taunts and abuse of the victorious army. Several of the Federal soldiers were severely beaten, and one or two killed. In one of these street brawls, a young man, a citizen of Vicksburg, and volunteer aid on Gen. Baldwin's staff, shot a Federal soldier dead for using insulting language. He was taken to General Grant's headquarters, and after a hearing released.

During the week spent in the enemy's lines, we had several opportunities of hearing the sentiments of both the officers and soldiers of the Federal army. Among the officers, it was the same everlasting cant about the Union, and their determination that it should be restored; but among the privates the

greed for gain, and the object with which they fight was not concealed in the slightest degree. They spoke in raptures of the capacity of Mississippi's soil for white labor, and declared their intention to get a grant of land from the United States, and settle there after the war is over. This unblushing declaration was accompanied by the assertion that, as the South had rebelled against their government, it was only just that the property of the people should be divided among their troops. Such remarks were the principal causes of the street fights between the two armies, as the high spirit of our soldiers could ill brook this style of apportioning their homes and property by the enemy.

By Friday, the 10th of July, the prisoners having been paroled, orders were issued to the different brigade commanders to make preparations for marching the next morning, and accordingly the troops were got in readiness for their departure.

On Saturday morning, at half-past eleven o'clock, the Confederate soldiers took up their line of march. It was a mournful and harrowing sight. The soldiers felt their disgrace, and there was not one gallant heart in the mass of men, that did not feel half bursting with sorrow and humiliation at being compelled to march through the enemy's guards who were stationed on both sides of the road to some distance beyond the entrenchments. But nothing could avert the degradation; so with downcast looks, and countenances on which a knowledge of the bitterness of their defeat could be seen plainly stamped, they filed past the enemy, who gathered in large numbers to witness their departure.

It was a day never to be forgotten by those who assisted in the defense of Vicksburg. So filled with emotion were many of our men, that large tear drops could be seen on their weather-beaten countenances, and ever and anon they would pause in their march, and, turning back, take one last sad look at the city they had fought and bled for. All felt that, serious as the disaster was to the Confederate cause, it was nothing to their humiliation. Amid the storm of shot and shell that poured upon them, they had remained cheerful and confident; but at this moment their hopefulness had departed; the yell of defiance that had so often struck terror in the hearts of their foe, was not to be heard; their willing hands no longer grasped the weapons of a good cause; their standards trailed in the dust, and they were prisoners of war. Silently and sadly they marched on, and in a few minutes Vicksburg was lost to their view.

Thus fell the city of Vicksburg after a defense of over twelve months, and a siege which lasted for forty-seven days, forty-two of which a garrison of not more than twenty-five thousand effective men had subsisted on less than one-quarter rations. The Confederate army fought with a valor that not even the defend-

ers of Saragossa and Mantua ever surpassed. Subject to a bombardment of a nature so terrific that its equal has never been known in civilized warfare; through rain and sunshine, storm and calm, writhing under the pangs of starvation, these gallant Southern troops, whose deeds will form one of history's brightest pages when the annals of this siege shall become known, stood up to their post, and, with almost superhuman valor, repulsed every attack made by their enemy, and inflicting tremendous loss on him, until surrendered by the General whose want of ability and confidence in himself had entailed these sufferings and hardships on them.

It is estimated that the number of missiles thrown in the entrenchments, exceeded thirty thousand daily; and by the official report of General Grant's Chief of Artillery, it would appear that twenty millions three hundred and seventy thousand one hundred and twenty-two missiles of all kinds were thrown in the works, which would make it, by calculation, over four hundred thousand missiles, including small arm ammunition, daily thrown. This, however, must be an exaggeration, unless Grant's Chief of Artillery included the number of rounds of small arms used in the different battles prior to the investment of Vicksburg, which lasted only forty-seven days. He, however, gives the number as having been fired *into the city*, which, if correct, would only show the gigantic nature of the bombardment. The number of shots from artillery are averaged, by the Chief of Artillery for Grant's army, at 32,617 per day; but then he only gives 142,912 rounds as having been fired during the entire siege. It is very likely that an error exists in the last estimate, as more than that number was fired. We are rather inclined to think the number should have been 1,420,912, as that would bring it nearer to his daily estimate.

We cannot close this chapter without passing a just compliment to the Surgeons attached to the garrison of Vicksburg. Although they were from morning to night engaged in their duties to the soldiers, they were always found administering to the sick and wounded non-combatants of the city. Among the many, we must mention Dr. E. McD. Coffey, Chief Surgeon of Bowen's division, who was unremitting in his attentions to this class of sufferers, and always had several sick and wounded women and children under his charge. To this gentleman we were indebted for an introduction to Major General McPherson, who is, without doubt, the only real gentleman among the Federal Generals to whom we were introduced. He was very polite, never using the epithet "rebel" in the presence of our officers or soldiers, and avoided, as much as possible, any expression of exultation at the fall of Vicksburg when in our company.

Before bringing this chapter to a close, we would endeavor to remove the false idea among our people, that Vicksburg was

surrendered after a feeble defense. The city was defended as desperately as could be required. The only thing to be said is, that had proper generalship been displayed, there would have been no necessity to use the works surrounding Vicksburg. *After we were invested, the defense of Vicksburg commenced,* and though the city is now in the hands of the enemy, it has brought him no honor in its capture, nor added a single laurel to his wreath of victory. *Starvation* succeeded in doing what the prowess of their arms could never have performed. The result was a reverse to the Confederate arms; but when future generations shall speak of this war, the deeds of the gallant men who defended the city, will be extolled among the most heroic feats of the war, and the descendants of those who fought behind the entrenchments of Vicksburg, will be proud of the knowledge that their fathers aided in its defense. All honor to their unswerving patriots! Nobly did they sustain the honor of their country, and the glory of their past deeds; and, falling as they did, the historian of this war will declare that, in their fall as much honor was gained as if they had triumphed in their defense.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN, FROM THE LANDING OF THE ENEMY TO THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

When writers far away from the scene of military operations attempt to censure the actions of military men, particularly if not well acquainted with the facts attending such operations, the voice of censure should be raised in condemnation of such a course; but when the case is reversed, and the writer is present, and witnesses the short-comings and errors of a General, it is a great folly to charge him with giving to the public opinions of the incompetency of Generals, because he happens not to be a military-educated man, or to hold no position in the army. It does not require military talent to decide whether or not a General is competent; common sense and a sound judgment, seasoned or strengthened by the opinions of other and better informed men, are all that is needed to make those ideas not only able, but in reality truthful and correct.

It is with these opinions that we venture to publish this review of General Pemberton's campaign, from the landing of the enemy at Bruinsburg to the surrender of Vicksburg. Many of the comments and criticisms made in these pages, are the result of strict observation before the investment; and fears of what we deemed errors and signs of incompetency on the part

of Lieutenant General Pemberton, were expressed by us in private conversation, some weeks before the enemy had landed. We had, however, determined not to make them public, until they could be confirmed by men of well known military talent, and high position in the Confederate army. Circumstances having favored our wishes, special pains were taken to observe and note down all the sentiments expressed by those who, from their standing in the army, are quite capable of judging and of forming correct ideas.

We were not present in every engagement which we relate; but all the accounts given in this work were received from *General* officers who were present, and to whose information we attach importance, as they emanate from soldiers of great ability and valor. We found, in conversation with many distinguished officers, that their ideas were identical to ours, and, strengthened by their sentiments, we give to the public the criticisms and comments to be found in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE ERROR IN NOT MASSING OUR ARMY AT GRAND GULF.

As soon as the enemy's fleet had passed our batteries at Vicksburg, it became apparent that the first point attacked would be Grand Gulf. The garrison at that place consisted of two small brigades of Missouri and Arkansas troops under Gen. Bowen, with the brigades of Col. Reynolds, of Stephenson's division, and Brigadier General Baldwin's, of Smith's, in *Vicksburg* as a reinforcing column. The total number of men in this force, when combined, could not have been seven thousand effective men. On the 30th of April, the enemy landed at Bruinsburg unopposed, and was allowed, from want of troops to oppose him, to march to Port Gibson, where he met General Bowen.

Here it was, in the opinion of military men, that Lieutenant General Pemberton committed an error in not massing his entire army at Grand Gulf, as soon as the enemy's fleet had passed our batteries. From the nature of the country around Bruinsburg, artillery and sharpshooters posted along the banks of the river would have effectually prevented the Federal army from landing at that point, and had they ventured to land lower down in the vicinity of Rodney, and marched through the country by of Tabor's Creek to Bayou Pierre for the purpose of getting in our rear, the forces under General Johnston, at Jackson, Mississippi, could have been thrown rapidly from Clinton to Utica,

Mississippi, and, crossing below where Bayou Pierre branches off in two bodies, have hemmed in the enemy between them, and our forces at Grand Gulf. There would then have been but two alternatives left for the enemy: either to fall back in haste to Rodney, or fight a battle under such disadvantages that victory would almost have been a certain result to the Confederate army.

The enemy's entire force at that point did not number more than forty or fifty thousand men, while our army, under Lieutenant General Pemberton, was about twenty-five thousand, which, with an addition of ten thousand men, the estimated strength of General Johnston's army, from Jackson would have reduced the disparity of numbers sufficiently to give us strong hopes of victory. We comment, in this way, from the fact, that if General Bowen, with only seven thousand men, could have held in check the enemy's entire force for over twenty-four hours, we think it but reasonable to suppose that our army, when five times as strong, could have defeated him.

These, however, are but speculations, and granting, from our limited military experience, that the ideas given above are not feasible, what prevented Lieut. Gen. Pemberton from throwing his entire force on the enemy at Port Gibson, and crushing him before any more troops could have been brought across the river? The enemy had but a limited number of transports, and the time it would have required to convey troops across the river to reinforce their army, would have been amply sufficient for our forces to have inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, from which he could not have recovered.

The defenders and apologists of General Pemberton's movements, while acknowledging that the best course would have been to mass our army at Grand Gulf, assert that he was prevented from so doing by the conflicting opinions of his Major Generals. It is said by them that General Pemberton's desire was to fight the battle of Vicksburg at Grand Gulf, but that Major General Stephenson gave it as his opinion, that the enemy would attack the city in front; Major General Forney had an idea that Snyder's Bluff would be the point of attack, and Major General Smith expected the enemy to land and attempt the storming of the works at Chickasaw Bayou. Lieutenant General Pemberton, it is said, did not share these opinions, but from an apprehension, if disaster should follow his removing the troops from Vicksburg, by an attack of the enemy on the points above named, it would be said that he disregarded the opinions of his subordinates and brought on the evil, he yielded to them, and suffered General Bowen to be overpowered at Port Gibson, and through weakness in numbers, and fears of being surrounded, to destroy the works at Grand Gulf and evacuate the place, thus leaving a path open to the enemy through the State of Mississippi.

Whether this defense be a truthful statement of facts, we cannot tell, and will not venture to vouch for it, but we give it so that Lieutenant General Pemberton shall have the benefit of all the argument and assertions brought forward in his favor. If, however, this defense is true, we see no way in which it can aid in removing the responsibility off Gen. Pemberton's shoulders; on the contrary, it shows a weakness and want of confidence in himself, which would alone be proof enough of his incompetency to command a department of such magnitude and importance as the one he was in control of.

The statement is, that General Pemberton was in favor of reinforcing Gen. Bowen, but was overruled in so doing by the representations of his Major Generals, who entertained opinions which he did not share. The question is then natural, when we ask: who was the commander of the army at Vicksburg? If General Pemberton had ordered either of his subordinate Generals to march their divisions, or part of their divisions, to Grand Gulf, they could not have disobeyed the command, but would have reinforced Bowen according to the orders received. But granting that this story is not true, and we have grave doubts of its reliability, it would seem that some one was at fault in allowing the other divisions of our army to remain in idleness at Vicksburg, while Bowen, with only seven thousand men, was giving battle at Port Gibson to a Yankee army forty thousand strong.

It has been also said, in defense of Lieutenant General Pemberton, that the enemy were making feints upon his position at Chickasaw Bayou and Snyder's Bluff, and had he reduced his forces they would have known it, from the numerous spies they had in Vicksburg. Granting all this argument, we see no reason why General Pemberton could not have learned by the same source as they derived their information of the strength of our army, that the movements made by the enemy, were mere feints, which amounted to nothing, as they had not sufficient men to make an attack.

In addition to all this mass of argument, it was well known that the whole Federal army was massing near St. Joseph, Louisiana. Gen. Pemberton had, then, but one of two courses to pursue: either to prevent their landing at Bruinsburg, or massing his army at Grand Gulf, and giving battle as soon as they landed. It is absurd to suppose that General Grant, after landing his army, would have avoided a battle, and marched on Jackson or Clinton, with the knowledge that a Confederate force of nearly thirty thousand of the finest fighting men in the world, could, as soon as he attempted such a move, have been hurled upon his left flank and rear. We therefore concur in the opinion of not less than seven of Gen. Pemberton's subordinate Generals, that a grave error was committed in not massing our army at Grand Gulf, and fighting the battle of Vicksburg at that point.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE ERROR IN REMAINING ON THE WEST BANK OF THE BIG BLACK.

After the battle of Port Gibson, and evacuation of Grand Gulf by General Bowen, the Confederate army fell back to the West bank of the Big Black, in the vicinity of Bovina, Mississippi, while detachments from it were engaged in watching the different fords on the river. All the troops on the east bank of the Big Black were posted on the railroad, as far as Edward's Depot, about twenty miles from Vicksburg. The strength of our army at that time could not have been less than from twenty-three to twenty-six thousand men, well armed and equipped, and supported by at least sixty pieces of light artillery.

While our army was remaining on the west bank of the Big Black, the Federal forces were marching through the State by way of Cayuga, Raymond and Clinton, with the intention of driving Johnston across Pearl river, and thus removing the chance of his rear being exposed when he marched on Vicksburg. In making this movement, he detached a small portion of his troops for the purpose of making a feint on General Pemberton's forces, and keeping him on the west bank of the Big Black. Here it was, that Lieutenant General Pemberton again allowed himself to be deceived, and no measures were taken to follow the enemy, whose rear and flank were now exposed to our forces. The question at issue is, whether General Pemberton was aware of Grant's marching on Jackson, Mississippi, or was he ignorant of the fact. If he was aware of it, we see no way in which he can defend himself from the charge of displaying a want of generalship in not pursuing the advantage opened to him, and attacking the enemy. It is said, in defense of this apathy displayed by the Lieutenant General, that he was opposed to crossing the river, his plan being to wait until the enemy had penetrated the State, when he would march forward and cut him off from the river, and thus either compel them to fight under great disadvantage, or starve from want of provisions. This idea is not feasible, for two reasons: First, because, as soon as Grand Gulf fell, Vicksburg became our base of operations, which required that the rear of our army should always be directed to the city. By making the move his defenders claim he contemplated, General Pemberton would have had the rear of his army to the Mississippi river, and liable to attack at any moment by reinforcements crossing to succor Grant, besides which Vicksburg would have been left exposed, and the enemy by rapidly marching would have been able to reach the city before we could, our army not being large enough to be divided so as to defend Vicksburg at the same time that this move was being

made; and secondly, the idea of starving out the enemy was not feasible, as we have General Grant's official report to certify that his entire army subsisted on the country for eight days, and found a plenty of food wherever they went.

It is our opinion that General Pemberton was not aware of the enemy's marching toward Jackson, and this opinion is shared with us by officers of high rank. If this opinion is correct, we are at a loss to understand how a General commanding an army can remain ignorant of the movements of his adversary, unless he is incompetent. Did not General Pemberton have his spies? Or, why did he not have them? The country through which the enemy marched is the most patriotic portion of the Confederacy, and the citizens would have gladly given all the information they had of the whereabouts of the enemy.

What excuse can General Pemberton give for permitting Grant to march unmolested from Grand Gulf to Clinton? We see none. This alone would be sufficient to prove him incompetent to command an army like the one he had control of at Vicksburg. In no other instance, during this war, has such short sighted Generalship been displayed, and we cannot but attribute it to a want of military talent. Common sense—common reason, should convince those desirous of shielding Gen. Pemberton from censure, that he was out-generaled, not by General Grant's military superiority, but by his own lack of ability.

It is an acknowledged fact, that the division and brigade commanders almost unanimously favored an advance of our forces on the enemy, but that General Pemberton opposed it, until ordered to do so by General J. E. Johnston. This statement is brought forward in defense of General Pemberton, and as an apology for the loss of the battle of Baker's Creek. We then see, in this assertion, the whole facts of the case laid bare. The Lieutenant General opposed marching on the enemy.—Why did he oppose it? Because he was not aware that the enemy's rear was exposed to him, must be the natural inference drawn from his action.

Had our army followed Grant toward Clinton, we would have compelled him to turn back and give battle, which movement would have exposed his rear to Johnston, and no one imagines for a moment that Gen. Jos. E. Johnston would have failed to avail himself of the opportunity offered, and attacked with what force he had. But this was not done; our army remained on the Big Black in idleness, while the enemy were marching on Johnston, and General Pemberton failed to do his duty, until ordered by General Johnston, in an official dispatch, which was intercepted by the enemy, who availed themselves of its contents, and succeeded in defeating General Pemberton, after a battle long and gallantly contested, not through any Generalship on his part, but through the indomitable valor of our soldiers.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE BATTLE OF BAKER'S CREEK—MAJOR GENERAL LORING'S ACTION IN IT—FALSE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.

It has been charged by the friends of General Pemberton, that but for the unaccountable absence of General Loring's division, the battle of Baker's Creek would have been won. We shall now see in what way this charge is true. Major General Loring's division came into action after Stephenson's division had lost nearly all its artillery, and as soon as it became engaged was subject to the same terrible fire as Stephenson's had been; at the same time Stephenson's division, after fighting gallantly for some time without any artillery, was compelled to fall back from the overpowering numbers of the enemy, thus leaving Loring's flank exposed. What was then to be done? If Gen. Loring had made a stand and continued fighting, it would have been to have his division cut to pieces and captured, while to retreat to Vicksburg he knew full well would only hasten the downfall of the city.

With the capture of his artillery, and the breaking of Stephenson's division, the battle of Baker's Creek was irrevocably lost. This is the opinion of nearly all the officers who were in that battle, and from them have we derived ours. Nothing but the most desperate fighting on the part of General Bowen's division, and what of Stephenson's division remained together, saved our entire army from being captured. The enemy had already flanked us, and were marching rapidly upon our rear when he was checked by Bowen, and the army saved.

It was with the knowledge of this fact, that General Loring decided upon cutting his way through, knowing that he could better serve the country by so doing, than by being penned up in Vicksburg, where his division would be only so much more to feed. Accordingly his men were all safely drawn off the battle-field, by one of the most brilliant movements of this war, and marched to Jackson.

Not the slightest responsibility can be made to rest on Major General Loring for the loss of the battle of Baker's Creek. So little was he blamed by the remainder of the Generals and the other officers, that it was universally believed that if he had been in command of our army, the enemy would have been defeated, and a victory instead of a disaster, been chronicled for the South in the history of this war. We see nothing that General Loring performed on that battle-field, which should make him responsible for its loss, and we believe the same opinion is held by the officers and men of the garrison of Vicksburg. Those parties who are now safe in the Confederate lines, trying to cast the blame on a gallant and tried veteran, should recol-

lect that by General Loring's foresight and ability, his division of several thousand men, instead of being prisoners of war, is now in Mississippi, standing as a barrier to the advance of the enemy, and ready, under their leader, to fight as well as they have always done before.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

OUR WORKS ON THE BIG BLACK RIVER.

After our defeat at Baker's Creek, the Confederate army fell back to a series of works erected on the east of the Big Black river, and were afterwards driven from them on the day following. It is said that the object of these works was to defend the bridges across the river, and to prevent Snyder's Bluff from being flanked. We do not believe that such was the idea, but rather think the intention was to make it a line of defense in the event of defeat. Before making any comments on what is generally deemed an error in our choosing this side of the river as a line of defense, we will endeavor to give a description of of the country, and its surrounding features, on both sides of the Big Black.

The *east* bank of the river is a level and almost open country, extending for miles. It is true that it is cut up by creeks, and a portion of the land is swampy, but these offered but little impediment for an army to attack the line of works, which was thrown up on this side of the river, as was illustrated by the easy march of the enemy on the intrenchments, and their capture by them.

The *west* bank of the river rises to an almost precipitate height, overlooking the east shore, and forming a succession of lofty cliffs. The natural strength of this side offered the greatest inducements and the best advantages for a line of defense, as we will endeavor to show in our comments on the works that were erected on the opposite shore.

As soon as our army was defeated at Baker's Creek, instead of falling back to the intrenchments on the east shore of the river, had they crossed the bridge and burned it after them, they would then have placed the river between the Confederate army and the enemy. After crossing, the bluffs could have been lined with what artillery remained uncaptured, and the enemy could never have crossed under the raking fire which would have been kept up on the opposite shore below them.

By holding this position for two or three days, we would have been enabled to remove all the provisions from the adjacent plantations, and taken them into Vicksburg, thus supplying the

garrison with sufficient food to last them at least three months full rations. It may be said that the enemy could have crossed the river, either above or below our position, and thus flanked us; but it must be apparent that for them to have made such a move would have taken at least three days, by which time the object with which the position was held would have been gained, and our army could then have fallen back to Vicksburg. Had we succeeded in holding the works erected on the east bank of the Big Black, our position would have been much worse, as the enemy could have, with greater ease, crossed the river from the east to the west than otherwise, and thus have cut us off from Vicksburg, and also capturing the city without any resistance whatever.

It has been said by parties desirous of defending Lieutenant General Pemberton, that it was never his intention to make the works on the east bank of the Big Black a line of defense; his object in attempting to hold the works being only for the purpose of gaining time to make a safe retreat into Vicksburg. If such is the case, we quote the opinion of a prominent officer of the garrison in saying, that the idea was a most absurd one, as common sense should show that to gain time for our men to fall back to Vicksburg, a river between them and the enemy would have been an aid instead of an obstacle.

With what object then were the works on Big Black erected? We have seen no official report of General Pemberton, but must certainly say, that to our limited military experience, the idea of making a line of defense at that point, or using the works for the purpose of gaining time for our army to fall back in the event of defeat, is something new in the annals of this war, and a species of generalship that no other commander in the service has yet displayed.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE NEGLECT TO PROVISION VICKSBURG.

The neglect to provision Vicksburg with a supply of food large enough to supply the garrison for a siege of six months, is too glaring an error to need much comment on. Suffice it to say that provisions could easily have been obtained, had those officials, whose duty it was to procure subsistence, attended to their business, and not depended solely on what could be found on the railroads, or impressed from the farmers, who chanced to be at convenient distances from Vicksburg or Jackson.

While censuring these subordinate officers, we insist that equal blame must be attached to the Commanding General of the department. It is said that Lieutenant General Pemberton

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always believed a large supply of food was stored in Vicksburg. Believed! Let us quote what the regulations say in relation to the duties of Generals commanding fortified places. Section 818 is worded as follows:

* * * * * "He (referring to the commanding) studies the works, and the exterior with a view of attack and investment, the strength of the garrison, the artillery, the munitions of war, *subsistence and supplies of all kinds*, and takes *immediate* measures to *procure what is necessary* to be sufficient."

We shall now ask: in what manner did the Lieutenant General commanding the department of Mississippi and East Louisiana perform the duties, not left for his judgment to find out, but actually laid down in the Army Regulations? All assertions that provisions could not be obtained are utterly false; it is well known, by all who were in Vicksburg, that numerous offers were made by the planters on the Mississippi river above the city, in the Fall of 1862, when boats were running up the Yazoo river, to give the Government all their crops, which were lying exposed to the enemy, if the officials would send for them. It is also well known that the planters of the Yazoo district offered their crops *free of charge*, and yet no step was made to accept the gift so patriotically tendered.

A correspondent of the Richmond *Sentinel*, in an article defending Lieutenant General Pemberton, claims that it never was intended to stand a siege of an indefinite length of time. We see no reason for this assertion. Sieges have been known to last for years, and in the same way could Vicksburg have been held. It is further claimed, that the garrison did not surrender from want of food, but from weakness. We now ask: what caused their weakness? Was it not the want of food? Had the men been well supplied with rations, they would have been almost as strong on the forty-seventh day as they were on the first. It was, therefore, from starvation, and nothing else, that they surrendered.

CHAPTER XL.

CONCLUSION.

In concluding this work, we must disclaim having censured General Pemberton from any feeling of prejudice against that officer. Had the Court of Inquiry been held, as it was intended, this book would never have been published, as the true account of the operations in the Department of Mississippi and Louisiana would have been given to the people, and a book of this nature would not have been necessary.

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of General Pemberton's inability to meet such movements, which resulted in the downfall of the city, formed some time before the investment, on account of proper energy in transacting the military operations around Vicksburg. This war has developed two classes. One class is of opinion that positions on the river, if well fortified, must always be taken, where they command a fleet and control such waters; while the other, looking back to the history of past warfare, are of the opposite opinion. Of the former class belong Lieutenant General Pemberton, as his recommendation to evacuate Charleston and dismantle the fortifications would show; while in the latter class we would place General G. T. Beauregard, who has for over three months been successfully defending the very city that General Pemberton advised evacuating. In making these remarks, we will not say that General Pemberton believed attempting the defense of Vicksburg hopeless. We are certain he did all in his *ability* for its defense, but that he was incompetent to hold the position in which he had been placed. To use the words of a distinguished General in the Confederate army, "General Pemberton tried to do his best, but was always busy doing nothing."

We must beg to disclaim any desire to make this work a portion of the *history* of this war, in the strict sense of the word. Our idea has only been to furnish the reader with a narrative of all that transpired during the two sieges of Vicksburg, and to do justice to the gallant men who fought, bled, and suffered in its defense. Many errors and misstatements *may* be found in it, but wherever they occur it has been from information obtained from parties whose high standing in the Confederate army warrants their publication. If there are any such found, we shall, with pleasure, after the error is shown and proved to us, make the necessary *amende honorable*.

In conclusion, we would say that our censure of General Pemberton has not been influenced by public opinion, as a proof of which we would state, that for months past, amid the storm of charges brought against General Bragg for incompetency, we have defended him through the columns of the press, because, with the lights before us, he appeared an able and competent officer. None but the purest motives of *conscience* and *opinion* have induced us to chronicle the censure contained within, and though General Pemberton may, before long, regain the confidence of the people, and distinguish himself as an officer, while we would with pleasure record his achievements, we should always remain of the same opinion—that he exhibited a great want of competency in his control of the department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, and particularly in the defense of VICKSBURG.

THE END.



